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Executive Summary
This Congressional Budget Office primer on Social Security describes the ele-ments of the program that are most relevant to the current debate about SocialSecurity’s future.  The primer comes at a time when policymakers are grappling
with the issue of how to deal with the looming retirement of the baby-boom genera-
tion.  Over the next three decades, the number of people in the United States age 65 or
older is projected to rise by more than 90 percent, while the number of adults under
age 65 will increase by only about 15 percent.  That demographic shift will pose new
challenges for the Social Security program, the federal government, and the U.S.
economy.
This primer examines the demographic patterns that are causing the graying of
the U.S. population and looks at several strategies that have been proposed for prepar-
ing for that aging population.  It emphasizes the economic and budgetary aspects of
Social Security—particularly, how changes to the program might affect the nation’s
ability to deal with its impending demographic shift.  Some of the key points of the
primer are outlined below.
The Challenges of an Aging Population
 Once the baby-boom generation retires, the amount of money that the fed-
eral government will spend on Social Security will grow substantially.  That
spending is projected to increase by more than 50 percent over the next
three decades—from 4.2 percent of the nation’s total output (gross domestic
product, or GDP) this year to 6.5 percent in 2030—according to the inter-
mediate projections of the Social Security Administration.
 Although policymakers have many goals, if they want to limit the growth of
spending on the elderly as a share of GDP, they have only two options:
slow the growth of total payments to the elderly or increase the growth of
the economy.
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 Issues about how to prepare for an aging population ultimately concern how
many goods and services the economy will produce and how they will be
distributed, not how much money is credited to Social Security’s trust
funds.
 Social Security is much more than a retirement program.  Fewer than two-
thirds of its beneficiaries are retired workers.  The rest are disabled workers,
survivors of deceased workers, and workers’ spouses and minor children.
Strategies for Preparing the Nation
This primer looks at three strategies that have been at the heart of the public debate
about preparing for the nation’s future needs.  Those strategies are saving budget
surpluses and paying down federal debt, using surpluses to create private retirement
accounts, or changing the current Social Security program’s benefits or revenues.
Saving Budget Surpluses
 Saving surpluses and paying down federal debt could enlarge the economy,
give policymakers more flexibility for dealing with unexpected develop-
ments, and ease the burden of an aging population on future workers.
 Current projections suggest that surpluses could be large enough to pay off
all of the federal debt available for redemption by 2010.  After that, the
government could use surpluses to buy stocks and nonfederal bonds.  How-
ever, such purchases would raise important questions.  Would it be appro-
priate for the government to own shares in and possibly control private
companies?  And could the government’s involvement distort market sig-
nals and corporate decisionmaking?
Using Budget Surpluses to Finance the 
Creation of Private Accounts
 Using surpluses to pay for private retirement accounts might help protect
those surpluses from being used for other purposes.  It would also shift
control of the surpluses from the government to the private sector and avoid
the possible drawbacks of having the government own private assets.  A
system of private accounts that was based on 2 percent of workers’ earnings
could reduce the surplus by about $1 trillion over 10 years.
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 Some people argue that private accounts would offer higher rates of return
than the traditional Social Security system does, but that argument can be
misleading.  Social Security has a low rate of return largely because initial
generations received benefits far greater than the payroll taxes they paid;
that difference would have to be made up even if the Social Security system
was entirely replaced by private accounts.  Moreover, investing in the stock
market—through either private accounts or government purchases of stocks
for the Social Security trust funds—is no panacea.  Corporate stocks deliver
a higher expected return than government bonds because they carry higher
risks.
 A system of private accounts (even if it did not fully replace Social Secu-
rity) would raise some practical questions.  How much would the system
cost to administer?  Would it provide insurance against downturns in the
stock market?  At retirement, would people have to convert the assets in
their private account into an annuity (a series of regular payments that con-
tinues until the person and his or her spouse dies), and if so, under what
conditions?  How would the system handle benefits for workers’ families,
for survivors of deceased workers, and for disabled workers?  Would it
provide subsidies for people with low income and intermittent work histo-
ries, as Social Security does now? 
Modifying the Current Social Security Program
 Many types of reductions in Social Security benefits could increase GDP in
the long run.  However, the effect on the economy in the near term would be
uncertain, and the long-term gains could take a couple of decades to materi-
alize fully.  GDP could increase in the long run because reducing Social
Security benefits might encourage some people to save more.  Reductions in
benefits would probably reduce the lifetime resources of some transitional
generations, but later generations would be likely to earn higher wages and
pay lower taxes, on average.
 Raising taxes to pay for Social Security would have an uncertain effect on
GDP.  If the additional revenues were not used for other purposes, national
saving could increase.  However, raising the rate of the Social Security
payroll tax could reduce some people’s incentives to work.  For that reason,
cutting benefits might be more likely to expand the economy in the long run
than raising payroll tax rates would.
 If policymakers intended to alter the Social Security program, announcing
the changes well in advance would give people time to respond by adjusting
their plans for saving and retirement.
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Chapter One
Introduction and Summary
We can never insure one hundred percent of the population against one
hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried
to frame a law which will give some measure of protection to the average
citizen and to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-
ridden old age.
Statement of Franklin Delano Roosevelt upon signing
the Social Security Act, August 14, 19351
The Social Security Act of 1935, enacted in the midst of the Depression, iswidely seen as one of the most important legislative accomplishments in U.S.history.  The law created a program to provide lifetime payments to retired
workers beginning at age 65, laying the foundation for today’s Social Security pro-
gram.  The legislation also set up the federal system of unemployment insurance and
authorized federal grants to the states for various purposes.
Since then, Social Security has grown to become by far the largest federal pro-
gram.  Coverage has expanded, benefits have increased, and the program has been
broadened to include benefits for workers’ spouses and minor children, for the survi-
vors of deceased workers, and for disabled workers.  The federal government currently
pays monthly Social Security benefits to more than 45 million retired or disabled
workers, their families, and their survivors (see Box 1).  Those benefits will cost the
government a total of about $430 billion this year—roughly one-quarter of the entire
federal budget.
Over the next 30 years, the retirement of the baby-boom generation (the large
group born between 1946 and 1964) will pose new challenges for the Social Security
program, the federal government, and the U.S. economy.  The Social Security Admin-
istration projects that the number of people age 65 or older will rise by more than 90
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Box 1.
Recent Statistics About Social Security
The numbers below present a portrait of the Social Security program in December
2000 (except the numbers for the payroll tax, which are for 2001).  They are based on
data from the Social Security Administration.
Number of Social Security Beneficiaries
Retired Workers 28.5 million
Disabled Workers 5.0 million
Spouses of Deceased Workers 5.1 million
Spouses of Retired or Disabled Workers 3.0 million
Children of Retired, Disabled, or Deceased Workers1 3.8 million
Total Number of Beneficiaries 45.4 million
Average Monthly Social Security Benefit
Retired Workers $845
Disabled Workers $787
Spouses of Deceased Workers $790
Spouses of Retired or Disabled Workers $417
Children of Retired, Disabled, or Deceased Workers1 $406
Workers
Numbers of Workers in Employment Covered
by Social Security 152.9 million
Social Security Payroll Tax2
Tax Rate (Paid half by employer and half by employee) 12.4 percent
Limit on Worker’s Annual Earnings Subject to the Tax $80,400
Maximum Tax Owed (Paid half by employer
and half by employee) $9,970
1. Minor children and some adults disabled before age 22.
2. Besides the Social Security payroll tax, workers are also subject to a 2.9 percent payroll tax (paid half
by them and half by their employers) on covered earnings for the Medicare program.  There is no limit
on the annual earnings subject to that tax.
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percent in the next three decades (from about 36 million now to 69 million in 2030),
according to its intermediate assumptions (see Figure 1).  During the same period, the
number of adults under age 65—who will largely be the ones paying the taxes to
support their elders—will grow by only about 15 percent (from 170 million to 195
million).  Moreover, the number of elderly people is expected to keep rising at a faster
rate than the number of nonelderly people as life spans continue to lengthen.
On May 2, 2001, President Bush established a 16-member commission “to study
and report . . . specific recommendations to preserve Social Security for seniors while
building wealth for younger Americans.”  The President instructed the commission to
issue a report by this fall.  The Congress is likely to review the commission’s recom-
mendations as it determines what, if any, Social Security legislation it will send to the
President for his signature.
This report provides background information for the Congress as it considers
how to prepare for the retirement of the baby-boom generation and beyond.  The
report emphasizes the economic and budgetary aspects of Social Security—particu-
larly, how changes to the program might affect the nation’s ability to deal with its
impending demographic shifts.  This chapter highlights several of the report’s main
points.
The Challenges of an Aging Population
Observers can view the economic and budgetary consequences of the aging of the U.S.
population from at least three perspectives:  that of the trust fund framework used by
the trustees of the Social Security program, that of the total federal budget, and that of
the overall U.S. economy.
The most common perspective is that of Social Security’s own financial struc-
ture.  The program is financed largely by a tax on workers’ wages (a payroll tax). The
revenues from that tax are credited to two accounts (“trust funds”) in the federal bud-
get, one for each of the program’s two parts:  Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, and
Disability Insurance.  Those trust funds, which are maintained in the U.S. Treasury,
function mainly as accounting mechanisms to track Social Security’s revenues and
spending and to monitor whether the program’s designated sources of revenue are
producing enough money to cover expected benefits.  The program’s benefits, admin-
istrative costs, and other authorized expenditures are paid from those funds.  Balances
in the funds are held in the form of special interest-bearing Treasury securities.  
A broader perspective takes into account the pressures on the total federal bud-
get, not just the part of the budget specific to Social Security.  In particular, as the
population ages, spending on federal health care programs for the elderly and disabled
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Figure 1.
Projected Growth in the Adult Population, 2001-2075
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, The 2001 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Fed-
eral Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (March 19, 2001),
Table V.A2 (intermediate assumptions).
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2. Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (October 2000), p. 15.
Table 1.
Projected Federal Spending for Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid in 2001
In Billions
of Dollars
As a Percentage of
Total Federal Spending
Social Security 429 26.0
Medicare 238 14.4
Medicaid    131     7.9
Subtotal 798 48.3
Rest of Government    852   51.6
Total (Excluding net interest) 1,651 100.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:  An Update (August 2001).
will probably rise rapidly because of increases in federal costs per beneficiary as well
as in the percentage of the population eligible for benefits (unless major changes are
made in those programs).  The Medicare program provides health insurance to most
U.S. residents age 65 or older and to eligible disabled people.  Most of its participants
also receive Social Security benefits.  Medicaid is a joint federal/state program that
provides medical assistance to low-income people; in recent years, a large share of its
payments have gone to provide long-term care for elderly and disabled people in
nursing facilities.  The federal government will spend a total of about $370 billion on
Medicare and Medicaid this year.  Those programs, together with Social Security,
already account for nearly half of all federal spending, excluding interest payments on
federal debt (see Table 1).   If the programs are not changed, by 2030 they could con-
sume two-thirds of the federal budget.2
The broadest perspective—and the one emphasized in this report—takes into
account what might happen to the overall U.S. economy, not just to the federal budget.
As the population ages, total consumption of goods and services by the elderly will
increase, whether that consumption is financed through public programs or privately.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that federal spending for Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will account for roughly 15 percent of the nation’s
total output (gross domestic product) in 2030—double the current share (see Figure 2).
Large increases in spending on those programs, combined with any taxes or federal
debt needed to finance them, could have significant effects on the economy.  Examin-
ing how changes to those programs could alter the future size of the economy is im-
6  SOCIAL SECURITY:  A PRIMER September 2001
Figure 2.
Projected Federal Spending for Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid, 2000-2030 (As a percentage of gross domestic product)
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (October 2000 estimates).
portant because the goods and services that baby boomers will consume in their retire-
ment will largely be produced by future workers.
Issues to Consider in Reforming Social Security
Several aspects of the Social Security program and its outlook as the population ages
are especially important in considering changes to the program.  First, throughout its
long history, Social Security has had multiple goals—some related to redistributing
income among or within generations, others related to providing insurance to offset
lost earnings.  Policymakers will need to decide whether those goals are still appropri-
ate and, if so, how changes to Social Security would aid or hinder the achievement of
those goals and would affect various types of beneficiaries and taxpayers.  Those
decisions will also need to take into account the dramatic increase in the elderly popu-
lation that is expected in coming decades.
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Second, issues about how to prepare for an aging population ultimately concern
the amount of goods and services the economy will produce and how they will be
distributed, not how much money is credited to the Social Security trust funds.  In that
sense, the projected depletion of those funds—which is the focus of much of the
popular debate about Social Security’s future—is irrelevant.  The challenge of adjust-
ing to an aging population would need to be faced even if the trust funds never ex-
isted.
Third, deciding how to prepare for an aging population is likely to require
weighing the interests of today’s workers and Social Security beneficiaries against the
interests of future workers and beneficiaries.  No matter how it is packaged, any plan
to increase national saving today means that the U.S. population will consume fewer
goods and services now so that consumption can be greater in the future, when a larger
share of the population is retired.  Gone are the days when expansion of the labor
force could pay for the growth of Social Security benefits.  As the Congress looks at
policy changes, one consideration is that future workers and Social Security beneficia-
ries are likely to have higher standards of living, on average, than current workers and
beneficiaries do, because of future increases in productivity.
Strategies for Preparing the Nation
The 107th Congress has inherited Social Security reform as a major item on its
agenda.  Like previous Congresses, it faces projections that payments from the govern-
ment to the elderly will rise sharply as a share of the economy over the next 30 years.
Spending more on the elderly may be appropriate given the large increase in the older
population, but questions can be raised about how much that spending should rise.
Policymakers have many goals, but if they want to limit the growth of spending on the
elderly as a share of the economy, they can do so in only two ways:  either by slowing
the growth of total payments to the elderly or by increasing the rate of growth of the
economy.
Different options for reform would have different effects on economic growth.
To the extent that they boosted the future size of the economy and increased the na-
tion’s accumulation of assets, they could lessen the burden on future workers of gov-
ernment programs that serve the elderly.  In essence, the accumulation of assets
“prefunds” the future spending of retired baby boomers (as explained in Box 2).  That
action would reduce the relative costs of an aging population to future generations by
reducing payments to retirees as a share of the economy.
Policymakers could attempt to increase the size of the economy in several ways:
by running budget surpluses or promoting private saving (which can make more funds
available for investment in business equipment, structures, and other types of capital);
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Box 2.
Prefunding Future Consumption
Saving is one of the major ways that workers can prepare for retirement.  By spending less
than they earn, they can build up assets to pay for the consumption of goods and services
in their retirement.  Nations can prepare for an aging population in the same way.  Through
saving, nations can finance the construction of new business plants and equipment at
home and the acquisition of financial and physical assets in other countries.  Those domes-
tic investments enable the economy to produce more goods and services in the future, and
the income from the foreign investments supplements the income produced at home.
Together, those investments provide the resources to finance future consumption by work-
ers and retirees alike.  That process of saving and accumulating assets for future needs is
called prefunding because it sets aside current resources for future use.1
The word prefunding is sometimes also used to describe policy actions that finance
future spending by a government program, such as Social Security.  However, that usage
can be misleading.  For example, payments of future Social Security benefits could be
financed on paper simply by making transfers from the rest of the budget to the Social
Security trust funds.  Although such transfers improve the actuarial balances of the trust
funds, they do not directly change the government’s total spending or revenues and hence
do not increase national saving as a whole.  Moreover, unless such transfers alter policy-
makers’ future decisions about the budget, they will have no effect on the economy.  Thus,
they do not prefund future consumption in any meaningful way.2
Although asset accumulation is a central feature of prefunding, that does not mean
the government could prefund future consumption by investing the balances of the Social
Security trust funds in corporate stocks.  Changing the mix of securities held by those trust
funds would not increase the resources available for future consumption.  To buy stocks,
the government would have to give private sellers an asset of equal value.  Unless govern-
ment policy increased national saving, the investments in stocks would simply involve an
exchange of assets between the government and the private sector, not an increase in assets
for the nation as a whole.  (The economic effects of government investments in stocks are
discussed in more detail in Appendix A of this report.)
1. Nations may also be able to prepare for the future by investing in public infrastructure, education, and
research and development; however, many of those federal investments appear to have lower returns
than private investments do.  See Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Effects of Federal
Spending on Infrastructure and Other Investments (June 1988).
2. Some analysts distinguish between broad prefunding and narrow prefunding.  Broad prefunding raises
national saving, accumulates assets, and sets aside resources for future use.  Narrow prefunding—
which  refers to actions taken with respect to a particular government program—does not necessarily
imply that resources have been set aside for future use.  For more details, see Joseph Stiglitz, “Re-
thinking Pension Reform:  Ten Myths About Social Security Systems” (paper presented at the World
Bank Conference on New Ideas About Old Age Security, Washington, D.C., September 14-15, 1999).
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3. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:  An Update (August 2001).
4. For more details, see Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options (February 2001), Chapter 1.
by changing tax and regulatory policies to improve the efficiency of the economy or to
boost people’s incentives to work or improve their skills; or by spending money on
government programs that are oriented toward investment rather than current con-
sumption.  In addition, some changes to the Social Security program could have posi-
tive effects on economic growth.  For example, cutting future benefits might create
incentives for workers to save more.
Chapter 4 of this report focuses on three strategies that have generated a lot of
public attention:  saving budget surpluses and using them to pay down federal debt;
using those surpluses to create private retirement accounts; and making changes to the
benefits or revenues of the current Social Security program.  Those various ap-
proaches are not mutually exclusive; they could be combined in any number of ways.
Save Budget Surpluses
One strategy for preparing for the needs of an aging population is to preserve the
federal government’s annual budget surpluses and pay down the federal debt.  If the
government continues to spend less than it receives in revenues, it can increase na-
tional saving (if private saving does not fall to offset the government’s saving), boost
the stock of private capital, and expand the future size of the economy.  By saving the
surpluses, policymakers would have more flexibility for dealing with unexpected
developments, and future workers could be better prepared to bear the heightened
burden of making payments to an aging population.
CBO projects that if current laws and policies do not change, surpluses would
be large enough to pay off all of the federal debt available for redemption by 2010.3
What would happen after that?  If laws restricting the Treasury’s current investment
choices were modified, any further surpluses could be used to buy nonfederal assets,
such as stocks and bonds.  Although asset accumulation could increase the funds
available for capital investment and boost economic growth, it would be unprece-
dented for the federal government to hold a large stock of private assets.  The possibil-
ity of such holdings raises questions.  Would it be appropriate for the government to
own and possibly control private companies?  Could the government’s involvement
distort market signals and corporate decisionmaking?4
Questions have also been raised about whether using surpluses to pay down debt
and accumulate assets is politically realistic.  Would policymakers refrain from spend-
ing more or cutting taxes further and allow the government to pay off its debt and
build up private assets?  Recent experience creates some doubts on that score.  Al-
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though the government has paid down debt over the past few years, federal spending
has also been growing faster than inflation.  This year, the President and the Congress
enacted the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001—which will
reduce tax revenues by a total of almost $1.35 trillion between 2001 and 2011—and
policymakers are considering other proposals that would further reduce projected
surpluses.
Create Private Accounts
A second strategy is to use part of the budget surpluses to pay for the creation of
private retirement accounts.  Proposals for private accounts differ in many ways, but
they share a common feature:  the income from an account that would be available to
a worker at retirement would depend on the payments made into the account and the
rate of return on the account’s assets during the person’s working life.  Many types of
accounts are possible, and their effects would vary widely.
Supporters argue that using budget surpluses to finance the creation of private
accounts could provide many of the same economic benefits as saving the surpluses,
without the potential problems of having the government own shares in private compa-
nies.  In essence, proponents would shift control of part of the surpluses from the
government to individuals.
How much of those surpluses would a system of private accounts absorb?  The
answer would depend on the details of the proposal, but the amount could be large.
For example, creating a system of private accounts that was based on contributions of
2 percent of workers’ earnings could cost about $1 trillion over 10 years.5
Some people argue that private accounts would offer higher rates of return than
the traditional Social Security system does, but that argument can be misleading.
Social Security has a low rate of return largely because initial generations received
benefits far greater than the payroll taxes they paid.  That difference would have to be
made up even if the Social Security system was entirely replaced by private accounts.
Moreover, investing in the stock market (either through private accounts or through
government purchases of stock for the Social Security trust funds) is no panacea.
Simply raising the average rate of return on assets by taking on more risk would not
change the economic fundamentals.  Only if the accounts increased national saving
and enlarged the economy would they reduce future burdens.  Their impact on na-
tional saving would depend on how the accounts affected both government and private
saving.
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In setting up a system of private accounts, policymakers would have to address
many practical issues.  How much would the system cost to administer?  Would it
provide insurance against downturns in the stock market?  How would it handle bene-
fits for workers’ families, for survivors of deceased workers, and for disabled work-
ers?  Would the system give subsidies to people with low income and intermittent
work histories?  How would the system be regulated and investors informed?
Some of the answers to those questions could have implications for the econ-
omy.  For example, government guarantees that people would receive a minimum
level of retirement income in the event of a market downturn would probably reduce
national saving below what it would be without those guarantees.  And subsidies to
low-income workers that were phased out as wages rose could impose implicit taxes
on work and could discourage some people from working more.
Make Programmatic Changes
A third approach is to modify the current Social Security program.  Changes that have
been proposed include reducing benefits (for example, by raising the retirement age,
lengthening the period over which benefits are computed, or reducing annual cost-of-
living adjustments) or increasing payroll taxes.  The effect on the economy would
depend on the particular type of change.  Other things being equal, reducing benefits
might be more likely to increase the size of the economy than raising payroll tax rates,
which could lessen people’s incentives to work.
Economic models suggest that many types of benefit reductions could increase
the size of the economy in the long run because they could encourage some people to
save more.  However, those long-term gains could take a couple of decades to materi-
alize fully.  How the benefit cuts would affect the economy in the near term is uncer-
tain.
Slowing the growth of Social Security benefits would most likely reduce the
lifetime resources of some transitional generations.  However, it could also raise the
wages of later generations and reduce their tax burdens.  If benefits are to be cut,
changing the law now rather than later would give workers time to adjust their plans
for saving and retirement.

Chapter Two
An Overview of the
Social Security Program
Over the years, lawmakers have tried to make Social Security serve variouspurposes and categories of people.  In the process, they have created a compli-cated set of rules that determine the eligibility and benefit amounts of different
types of beneficiaries.  And they have crafted a special financial structure for the
program.  This chapter describes the key elements of the history, benefit structure, and
financing of Social Security that are most relevant to the current debate over the pro-
gram’s future.
Social Security’s Objectives
From the beginning of Social Security, its developers sought to achieve multiple,
sometimes conflicting, goals.  Later expansions of the program added other goals, and
amendments designed to curb the program’s rapidly growing costs did not limit its
objectives.
Today’s Social Security program is a hybrid—part redistribution program
(which transfers resources within and among generations) and part insurance program
(which provides insurance to workers and their families for losses resulting from a
worker’s death or disability).  Unlike the case with private insurance, however, partici-
pation in Social Security is mandatory.  And unlike private insurers, the federal gov-
ernment has the power to tax and thus does not need to charge current participants for
the full amount of the expected payouts.  Moreover, as with other federal programs,
new laws can be enacted to change the terms of the insurance, making it more or less
generous for its participants.
The Original Program
As its 1935 report to President Roosevelt indicates, the committee charged with devel-
oping Social Security legislation wanted to help all workers prepare for retirement, but
it was particularly concerned about helping retired workers who had low incomes:
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1. Project on the Federal Social Role, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935, 50th Anniversary
Edition (Washington, D.C.: National Conference on Social Welfare, 1985), p. 53.
2. Even though the formula for calculating monthly benefits is progressive (in that it favors retired workers with low
lifetime earnings), some people have questioned whether the overall benefit structure of Social Security is pro-
gressive.  They point out that men with low lifetime earnings have shorter life spans, on average, than other men.
Other people, however, observe that Social Security also provides benefits to the survivors of deceased workers
and to disabled workers; both of those features contribute to the program’s progressivity.
3. Project on the Federal Social Role, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security, p. 53.
4. “We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect
their pensions. . . .  With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.”
President Roosevelt, quoted on the Social Security Administration’s “History Page,” at www.ssa.gov/history/
quotes.html.
[I]t should not be overlooked that old-age annuities are designed to pre-
vent destitution and dependency.  Destitution and dependency are enor-
mously expensive, not only in the initial cost of necessary assistance but
in the disastrous psychological effect of relief upon the recipients, which,
in turn, breeds more dependency.1
The design of the Social Security system involves a trade-off between ensuring
a sufficient level of benefits to even the poorest recipients (the “adequacy” objective)
and distributing benefits so that workers who have paid more taxes for Social Security
receive more benefits (the “equity” objective).  The progressive benefit structure of
the program, described below, reflects the attempt to balance those two objectives.
Although the specific formulas for calculating benefits have changed since Social
Security began, retired workers with a history of low wages have always received a
higher percentage of their preretirement earnings in monthly benefits than other retired
workers do.  Nonetheless, workers who earned higher wages receive a higher level of
monthly benefits.2
Social Security’s main revenue source has always been a payroll tax imposed on
workers and their employers.  Benefits are calculated according to the earnings on
which the tax was paid, even though the revenues from taxing a particular worker’s
earnings are not set aside to pay for that worker’s future benefits.
One purpose of using payroll taxes rather than income taxes or other sources of
revenue was so that elderly beneficiaries would feel they had earned their benefits,
whether or not they had really done so.  The program’s developers were eager that
Social Security not be seen as a welfare program but rather as “a self-respecting
method through which workers make their own provision for old age.”3  Moreover,
President Roosevelt believed that such an approach would help ensure that future
policymakers would not be able to repeal the program.4  Undoubtedly, the perception
that beneficiaries were simply getting back what they had paid in—even though most
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5. Other changes included eliminating a provision in the 1935 law for lump-sum payments (of 3.5 percent of workers’
accumulated wages) for workers who were ineligible for benefits at age 65 or who died before then, establishing
a minimum benefit, and providing a lump-sum death benefit of six times the deceased worker’s monthly benefit
if the worker left no survivors eligible for monthly survivor benefits.
retired workers have received much more in benefits than they have paid in Social
Security taxes—has been a deterrent to changing the program. 
Later Developments
Later legislation greatly expanded the scope and complexity of Social Security, as new
purposes were added to the original ones.
 Legislation enacted in 1939—before the program had paid any monthly
benefits—added payments for spouses of retired workers and for survivors
of deceased workers.  Those provisions changed Social Security from a
strictly worker-based retirement program to one in which workers’ families
could also receive benefits.5
 Legislation enacted in 1956 created the Disability Insurance (DI) part of the
program, explicitly adding a new purpose to Social Security:  providing
insurance for earnings lost because of disability. 
 Legislation enacted in 1972 required Social Security to automatically adjust
benefits each year for inflation.  The creation of automatic cost-of-living
adjustments (COLAs) explicitly moved Social Security into the business of
providing annuities that are fully indexed for inflation.  Previously, each
across-the-board increase in benefits had required an act of Congress.
Not all amendments to the Social Security Act have expanded the program.
Many of the changes made since the mid-1970s were designed to slow the growth of
benefits, as policymakers responded to perceived short-term and long-term financial
problems with Social Security.
 Amendments enacted in 1977 revised the indexing provisions established in
1972 to make them less sensitive to inflation.  The procedure used to deter-
mine initial benefits was separated (“decoupled”) from the procedure used
to adjust benefits later for inflation.  Each worker’s earnings history, which
is used to determine his or her initial benefit, is indexed to reflect the
growth in average wages throughout the economy; later adjustments to that
benefit are based on changes in consumer prices rather than in average
wages.  In addition, the 1977 amendments increased revenues by raising the
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6. For more details of the 1977 amendments, as well as each of the other major changes in the Social Security
program, see Geoffrey Kollmann, Social Security: Summary of Major Changes in the Cash Benefits Program, CRS
Report for Congress RL30565 (Congressional Research Service, May 18, 2000).
7. For more-detailed information about the 1983 legislation, see John A. Svahn and Mary Ross, “Social Security
Amendments of 1983:  Legislative History and Summary of Provisions,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 7
(July 1983), pp. 3-48.
amount of a worker’s earnings that is subject to the payroll tax, indexing
that amount to growth in average wages, and increasing the tax rate.6  
 Amendments in 1980 and 1981 further reduced projected spending for So-
cial Security.  The 1980 amendments were designed to limit the growth in
the cost of the DI program.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 cut benefits further, largely by eliminating benefits for postsecondary
students.
 The Social Security Amendments of 1983 made some of the most signifi-
cant changes in the program’s history.7  Those changes came in response to
projections that the Social Security trust funds would soon be exhausted and
that the program faced a large, long-term deficit.  Spending was cut in the
short run by delaying a scheduled COLA for six months.  The biggest re-
duction in long-run costs came from gradually raising the age at which re-
tired workers could receive full benefits from 65 to 67 (for workers born in
1960 or later).  In addition, lawmakers increased Social Security revenues
by moving up the dates on which scheduled increases in the payroll tax
were to take effect, making some Social Security benefits subject to income
taxes, and including new federal workers and all employees of nonprofit
organizations in the program.
Related Federal Programs
Three separate government programs are closely related to Social Security in their
objectives and in the populations they serve.  Each one was established by amending
the Social Security Act.
Supplemental Security Income.  Under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program, enacted in 1972, the federal government provides monthly cash payments to
low-income people who are 65 or older or disabled.  SSI replaced previous state-
administered programs that had been jointly funded by the federal government and the
states with a single program that uses uniform, nationwide rules for eligibility.  Be-
cause SSI is a means-tested program, people must have income and assets below
specified amounts to be eligible for benefits.  (The eligibility criteria based on disabil-
ity are similar to those used to determine eligibility for DI benefits.)  The maximum
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(November 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/policy/programs/SSI/millennium/index.html.
9. Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Report, 2000 (May 2001), Table 7, available at www.ssa.gov/statistics/
ssi_annual_stat/2000/table7.html.
SSI benefit in 2001 for an individual with no other income is $531 a month; for a
couple, it is $796 a month.8  This year, the federal government will spend nearly $30
billion on SSI, the Congressional Budget Office estimates.
People who receive Social Security benefits and who have assets below the
specified level ($2,000 for an individual or $3,000 for a couple) can also receive SSI
benefits.  However, any unearned income of more than $20 a month that they receive
(including Social Security) reduces their SSI benefit by an equal amount.
In effect, SSI serves as a backstop to Social Security to ensure that elderly and
disabled people have a minimum level of income if they do not qualify for Social
Security or if their Social Security benefits are very low.  At the end of 2000, about 60
percent of the 1.3 million elderly recipients of SSI and 30 percent of the 5.3 million
disabled recipients were also receiving Social Security benefits.9 
The links between SSI and Social Security are important to consider when
examining the potential effects of changing the Social Security program.  If Social
Security benefits were reduced, some of the government’s savings would be offset by
increased spending for SSI.  Likewise, if Social Security’s minimum benefit was
increased, some of the additional cost would be offset by lower spending for SSI.
Medicare.  The second-largest entitlement program after Social Security, Medicare
provides health insurance coverage to elderly or disabled people.  Most Medicare
beneficiaries also receive Social Security.  Medicare, which was enacted in 1965,
comprises two programs—Hospital Insurance (HI) and Supplementary Medical Insur-
ance (SMI).  The HI program pays for inpatient care in hospitals, some stays in skilled
nursing facilities, some home health care, and hospice services.  The SMI program
pays for services from physicians, medical suppliers, and outpatient care facilities as
well as for some home health care.
This year, Medicare will spend about $240 billion on health care for 40 million
beneficiaries, CBO estimates.  The HI part of the program is financed largely by a
payroll tax levied on workers and their employers.  The SMI part of the program is
financed in two ways:  roughly one-quarter of its funding comes from monthly premi-
ums paid by enrollees, and the rest comes from the government’s general revenues.  In
all, beneficiaries pay for less than 15 percent of current Medicare outlays.
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10. Most workers need to earn 40 credits (known as quarters) to be eligible for retirement benefits.  Workers can earn
up to four credits each year on the basis of the amount they earned in employment covered by Social Security.  In
2001, one credit is earned for each $830 in wages.  Thus, a worker earning at least $3,320 this year will receive
four credits.  The amount of earnings required for a credit is indexed to average earnings for the labor force as a
whole.
11. For more detailed information about determining eligibility and benefit amounts, see the Social Security
Administration’s Web site (www.ssa.gov).  Users can estimate their own future benefits at that site as well.
Medicaid.  The Medicaid program, also enacted in 1965, is a joint federal/state pro-
gram that provides medical assistance to many of the nation’s poor people.  Payments
for long-term care (mainly for the elderly and disabled) account for about one-third of
total Medicaid spending.  The federal government and the states pay for the program
jointly, with the federal government’s share ranging from 50 percent to 83 percent
(depending on a state’s per capita income).  Federal spending for Medicaid will total
about $130 billion this year, CBO estimates.
How Social Security Works
The Social Security program will pay monthly benefits to about 45 million people this
year—more than 28 million retired workers, 5 million disabled workers, and 12 mil-
lion family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers.  In general, workers are
eligible for retirement benefits if they are at least age 62 and have had sufficient earn-
ings on which they paid Social Security taxes in at least 10 years.10  Workers whose
employment has been limited because of a physical or mental disability can become
eligible at an earlier age with a shorter employment history.  Various rules apply to
family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers.11
Although Social Security is often characterized as a retirement program, only
about 63 percent of its beneficiaries receive their payments as retired workers (see
Figure 3).  As of last year, 15 percent of beneficiaries were survivors of deceased
workers.   Most of those survivors were widows—either widows age 60 or older (who
composed about 10 percent of all beneficiaries) or younger widows who were caring
for a minor child or who were disabled.
The Disability Insurance program is an important but often overlooked part of
Social Security.  Workers under age 65 who had qualified for DI accounted for 11
percent of the people receiving Social Security benefits at the end of 2000; members
of their families accounted for another 4 percent.  Those percentages actually under-
state the role of Disability Insurance because DI recipients move into the retired-
worker category when they reach the normal retirement age.  (Although many of them
would have qualified for retirement benefits at age 62 anyway, the amount they re-
ceived by having their benefits calculated as disabled workers is typically much higher
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than it would have been if they had received benefits as retired workers.)  More than
10 percent of the people who began receiving Social Security retirement benefits in
1999 had been getting DI benefits.  Likewise, survivors of deceased DI beneficiaries
are not counted in the DI category.
Rules for Determining Retirement and Disability Benefits
Benefits for retired or disabled workers are based on those workers’ past taxable
earnings, expressed as an average level of earnings over their working lifetime (their
average indexed monthly earnings, or AIME).  For retired workers, the AIME is now
based on the highest 35 years of earnings on which they paid Social Security taxes (up
to the taxable maximum), with some adjustments.  Earnings before age 60 are indexed
to compensate both for past inflation and for real (after-inflation) growth in wages.
Figure 3.
Distribution of Social Security Beneficiaries, by Type of Benefit Received,
December 2000
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2001 (draft), Table 5.A1 (avail-
able at www.ssa.gov/statistics/Supplement/2001/index.html).
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12. Their average indexed monthly earnings would be about $2,540, or about $30,500 per year.  Applying the formula
for workers turning 62 this year, their PIA would be $1,150, or about $13,800 per year.  If they stopped working
and began receiving benefits shortly after their 62nd birthday, that amount would be permanently reduced by about
22 percent.  (All of those amounts are in 2001 dollars.)
(When benefits are calculated for disabled workers and for the survivors of deceased
workers, the AIME can be based on a shorter period.  Moreover, DI benefits are not
subject to any reduction for beginning to receive them before the age at which a re-
tired worker is eligible for full benefits.)  
Benefit Formula.  The Social Security Administration (SSA) applies a progressive
formula to a worker’s average indexed monthly earnings to calculate his or her pri-
mary insurance amount (PIA).  The PIA is the monthly amount payable to a worker
who begins receiving Social Security retirement benefits at the age at which he or she
is eligible for full benefits or payable to a disabled worker who has never received a
retirement benefit reduced for age.  (The age of eligibility is discussed in the next sec-
tion.)
The formula is designed to ensure that initial Social Security benefits replace a
larger proportion of preretirement earnings for people with low average earnings than
for those with higher earnings.  For workers who turn 62 this year, the formula is:
 PIA = (90 percent of the first $561 of the AIME) + (32 percent of the AIME
between $561 and $3,381) + (15 percent of the AIME over $3,381)
Those thresholds at which the percentage of the AIME replaced by the PIA changes
are known as “bend points” (see the top panel of Figure 4).  They change along with
changes in the average annual earnings for the labor force as a whole.  Consequently,
as wages rise over time, initial benefits increase at a similar pace.
Workers who are 62 now, who had average earnings throughout their career,
and who wait to retire until they reach the age at which they will be eligible for full
benefits (65 and four months for this group) will receive a monthly benefit of about
$1,150.  That payment will replace about 41 percent of their earnings in the year
before they retired.  If, instead, they retire this year soon after their 62nd birthday, they
will be eligible for a permanently reduced benefit of almost $900 a month.  That
amount will replace about 35 percent of their pretax earnings last year.12  (Most benefi-
ciaries’ after-tax replacement rates are higher than their pretax replacement rates.)
The replacement rate is inversely related to past earnings (see the bottom panel
of Figure 4).  For example, workers who earned half of the average wage each year are
eligible for a monthly benefit at age 62 of $575, replacing about 45 percent of their
past earnings (compared with 35 percent for workers with average earnings).  By
working longer and waiting to claim benefits, those workers would receive higher
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13. Specifically, earnings before the year that the worker turned 60 are indexed to reflect the growth in average earnings
between the years in which the wages were earned and the year that the worker turned 60.  Later earnings are not
indexed.  Benefits are indexed to the CPI for years after the worker turned 62 (regardless of when the worker begins
receiving benefits).
14. Craig A. Feinstein, Projected Demise of the Special Minimum PIA, Actuarial Note No. 143 (Social Security Ad-
ministration, Office of the Chief Actuary, October 2000), available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/note143.html.
annual benefits (replacing a higher percentage of their earnings), but the progressive
pattern shown in Figure 4 would not change.
The Social Security Administration makes various adjustments to the PIA, such
as reductions for early retirement and credits for later retirement.  In addition, at the
end of each year, SSA adjusts benefits by the amount of any increase in the consumer
price index (CPI).  For example, the 3.5 percent cost-of-living adjustment that took
effect in December 2000 reflected the increase in the CPI for urban wage earners and
clerical workers that occurred between the third quarter of 1999 and the third quarter
of 2000.
Because of Social Security’s indexing rules, the payments received by newly
eligible beneficiaries reflect both increases in prices and real growth in earnings
throughout the economy during the years that those beneficiaries worked.13  Later
increases in their payments—through annual COLAs—reflect only increases in prices
after the beneficiaries became eligible for benefits.  Thus, as long as real wages con-
tinue to rise, new beneficiaries will receive more than older beneficiaries, on average.
Another method for calculating benefits, known as the “special minimum PIA,”
is used to help people who worked for many years but had low earnings.  Essentially,
that alternative calculation is based on the number of years worked rather than on the
amount earned.  The few people who receive benefits based on that calculation—
150,000 beneficiaries at the end of 1999—are chiefly retired female workers.  Their
average benefit was less than $600 per month in 1999, or about $100 more than the
maximum SSI benefit for eligible individuals at that time.  Initial benefits based on the
special minimum method are indexed to prices rather than to wages, so even fewer
new Social Security recipients will gain from having their benefits calculated that way
in the future.14
Early Retirement.  Under current law, the age at which a worker becomes eligible for
full Social Security retirement benefits—the normal retirement age (NRA)—depends
on the worker’s year of birth.  For people born before 1938, the NRA is 65.  For
slightly younger workers, it increases by two months per birth year, reaching 66 for
people born in 1943.  The NRA remains at 66 for workers born between 1944 and
1954 and then begins to increase in two-month increments again, reaching 67 for
workers born in 1960 or later.  For workers whose 62nd birthday falls this year, the
NRA is 65 years and four months.
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15. The characteristics, circumstances, and financial resources of men and women who received reduced benefits in
the early 1990s are examined in Congressional Budget Office, Raising the Earliest Eligibility Age for Social
Security Benefits, CBO Paper (January 1999).
16. Starting with beneficiaries born in 1943, each year delayed beyond the normal retirement age (which will be 66
for that group) will add 8 percent to their retired-worker benefits.  The delayed-retirement credit for workers
reaching the normal retirement age this year is 6 percent.
17. If he began collecting retirement benefits as soon as he was eligible and lived to age 80, the worker would receive
216 monthly payments of $780 (adjusted for inflation), for a total of about $168,500.  By waiting until his normal
retirement age, he would receive 176 monthly payments of $1,000, for a total of $176,000.  Although he would
receive more money in total by waiting, he would not have access to that money until later.  What economists call
the present value of the two streams of future monthly payments would be equivalent if the worker considered $1
received now to be worth about the same as $1.03 (adjusted for inflation) received one year later.
Workers can begin receiving permanently reduced monthly retirement benefits
as early as age 62.15  People who start collecting retirement benefits at age 62 this year
will incur a permanent 22 percent reduction in their monthly benefits.  As the normal
retirement age rises to 67 for future groups of workers, that maximum reduction will
also increase.  (Once the NRA is 67, the permanent reduction will be 30 percent.)
Similarly, workers who delay collecting benefits beyond their normal retirement age
receive a delayed-retirement credit to compensate them for the reduction in the length
of time they will receive benefits.16
The size of the early-retirement reduction for workers is intended to be “actu-
arially fair”—in the sense that the total value of the reduced monthly benefits that an
average worker could expect to receive between age 62 and death is similar to the total
value of the full monthly benefits that the worker could expect to receive over that
time by waiting until he or she was eligible for full benefits.  For example, a single
male worker who retired this year at age 62 and expected to live about 18 more years
(to age 80) would be almost equally well off receiving reduced benefits of $780 per
month for 18 years or unreduced benefits of $1,000 per month for 14 years and eight
months (starting at his full-benefit age of 65 years and four months).17
Because a typical 62-year-old woman could expect to live longer than 18 years,
she would theoretically accrue greater total benefits by waiting until normal retirement
age to begin collecting them.  But many women might not incur the full reduction for
early-retirement benefits because they can switch from receiving reduced retired-
worker benefits to full survivor benefits upon the death of their husband.  If a widow
is at least the normal retirement age when her husband dies, she becomes eligible for
a full survivor benefit (equal to his benefit) if that benefit is higher than the one she
had been receiving on the basis of her own earnings record.
The size of the early-retirement reduction may encourage some workers to
collect early benefits and may discourage others.  For example, workers who believe
that their life span will be well short of the average might see the reduction as a good
deal and apply for benefits at age 62.  Conversely, workers who expect to live into
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18. Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2000, p. 240.  In 1999, 1.1 million of the 1.5
million people who SSA determined were entitled to new retirement benefits were ages 62 through 64.  About
850,000 of those people were 62-year-olds.  (Those estimates exclude the 200,000 Disability Insurance benefi-
ciaries who automatically became retired-worker beneficiaries when they reached 65.)
their 80s might regard the reduction as unacceptably high and wait until later to re-
ceive benefits.
More than two-thirds of the workers who began receiving Social Security retire-
ment benefits in the past decade implicitly decided that the reduction in their monthly
check was a price worth paying to start collecting benefits before age 65.  The major-
ity of those early recipients began collecting benefits at age 62.18
Earnings Test.  A complicated set of rules requires that Social Security benefits be
reduced if recipients earn more than a certain exempt amount.  Those rules, known as
the retirement earnings test, apply to wages but not to income from dividends, pen-
sions, or interest.  This year, the benefits of Social Security recipients who have not
yet reached normal retirement age will be reduced by $1 for each $2 they earn above
$10,680.  That earnings threshold automatically rises each year to match the increase
in a national index of average wages.
Workers whose benefits are reduced because of the retirement earnings test will
receive higher monthly benefits later—about 7 percent or 8 percent higher for each
year in which their benefits are entirely withheld because of the earnings test.  In many
cases, the increase in benefits will be even more than 8 percent because the additional
earnings can raise the earnings base from which benefits are calculated.  In short,
although the retirement earnings test is often portrayed as a tax on work, it is more
accurately described as a means of deferring benefits until workers no longer have
substantial earnings.
Until last year, a separate earnings test applied to workers ages 65 through 69.
The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 repealed that earnings test for
beneficiaries at or above the NRA, but it left in place the test for younger beneficia-
ries.  As the NRA rises to 67 over the next two decades, the size of the group subject
to the remaining earnings test will expand greatly.
Rules for Determining Family Benefits
More than one-quarter of Social Security beneficiaries receive payments as the spouse,
child, or survivor of a worker.  The rules for determining their benefits are important
in the context of reforming Social Security, both because so many people receive
those benefits and because several reform proposals address specific concerns raised
about those benefits, such as the treatment of one-earner versus two-earner couples.
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19. The Social Security Administration’s Web site (www.ssa.gov) contains several publications that provide more-
detailed information about each type of benefit.  A particularly useful one is Understanding the Benefits (February
2001).
20. Benefits received by a divorced spouse do not reduce the amount payable to a current spouse or other family
members.
21. Strictly speaking, as the Social Security Administration records the benefits, she will receive her own benefit as
a retired worker plus the difference between that amount and the benefit to which she would be entitled as a spouse
or widow.
The benefits that a spouse, child, or survivor of a worker receives are based on
the worker’s PIA.  The rules determining eligibility and benefit amounts are compli-
cated, particularly in situations in which the family members are also eligible for
benefits on the basis of their own work history or in which benefits are reduced be-
cause of the age of the beneficiary.  The key concepts are outlined below.19
An eligible wife or husband of a retired or disabled worker can receive a spousal
benefit equal to 50 percent of the spouse’s PIA.  To be eligible, the wife or husband of
the worker must be at least age 62 or caring for an eligible child.  A widow or wid-
ower can receive 100 percent of the amount to which the deceased worker would have
been entitled.  Minor children can also receive benefits.  However, the total amount of
benefits that a family can receive on the basis of a worker’s earnings record is limited
by a family cap (which is generally between 150 percent and 188 percent of the
worker’s PIA).
Special eligibility rules apply to former spouses.  In general, if their marriage
lasted at least 10 years, ex-husbands and ex-wives are entitled to the same benefits
based on their former spouse’s earnings as they would be if they had remained mar-
ried.  Otherwise, they are ineligible for family-based benefits.20
The rules governing cases in which a person is eligible for benefits as a retired
or disabled worker and as the spouse or widow of a worker are especially important
because an increasing percentage of wives have worked long enough to qualify for
benefits based on their own careers.  The general rule is that someone eligible for two
benefits receives the higher one, not both.
For example, suppose a husband and wife are the same age, both work until they
become eligible for full retirement benefits, the husband is eligible for a monthly
benefit of $1,000, and the wife is eligible for a retirement benefit of only $300.  In that
situation, because the wife’s benefit as a spouse ($500 a month) is higher than her
benefit as a retired worker, she will receive the spousal benefit.  Likewise, if she
outlives her husband, she will receive a survivor benefit of $1,000 per month (adjusted
for inflation).21  If, instead, the wife’s earnings history is the same as her husband’s,
she will receive her benefit as a retired worker.
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22. Above a second set of thresholds—$34,000 for single returns and $44,000 for joint returns—up to 85 percent of
Social Security benefits are subject to taxation as a result of legislation enacted later.  However, the revenues from
that additional tax are credited to Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund rather than to the Social Security trust
funds.
Financing and the Trust Funds
The Social Security program has two sources of dedicated tax revenues.  The main
one is a 12.4 percent tax on earnings, split evenly between workers and their employ-
ers.  The second, much smaller source is income taxes on some people’s Social Secu-
rity benefits.
Only earnings up to a maximum annual amount are subject to the Social Secu-
rity payroll tax.  That amount, the taxable earnings base, is adjusted each year for
changes in average earnings in the U.S. economy.  This year, the taxable base is
$80,400.  Thus, workers earning at least that amount and their employers will each pay
a tax of almost $5,000.
Since 1984, some Social Security recipients have also been required to pay
income taxes on part of their benefits.  Beneficiaries pay those taxes only if the sum of
their adjusted gross income, their nontaxable interest income, and one-half of their
Social Security benefits exceeds a fixed threshold.  If that total is more than $25,000
for taxpayers filing individually, or $32,000 for taxpayers filing joint returns, up to
half of the benefits are subject to taxation.22  Last year, about one-third of Social
Security recipients paid an estimated total of $12 billion in income taxes on their
benefits.  That amount represents about 3 percent of total Social Security spending.
The income thresholds for determining whether benefits are subject to taxation are not
indexed for inflation, so a larger share of recipients and benefits will be affected each
year.
All of the revenues from the Social Security payroll tax and part of the revenues
from taxing some Social Security benefits are credited to the trust funds for the Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance programs.  Social Security
benefits, the program’s administrative costs, and other authorized expenditures are
paid from those funds.
The trust funds serve mainly as accounting mechanisms to track revenues and
spending for Social Security.  They also help government officials monitor whether
taxes are producing enough revenues to pay for expected benefits.  The two trust funds
are running a combined surplus of more than $150 billion a year.  They are projected
to show accumulated balances of more than $1 trillion at the end of 2001 (see the
bottom panel of Figure 5).  However (as discussed in the next chapter), the size of
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Figure 5.
Income, Outlays, and Balances of the Social Security Trust Funds, 2001-2037
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, The 2001 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Fed-
eral Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (March 19, 2001),
Table VI.E8 (intermediate assumptions).
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23. The debate over the extent to which workers should pay for their own benefits is discussed in Project on the Federal
Social Role, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security; and in Herman B. Leonard, Checks Unbalanced:
The Quiet Side of Public Spending (New York: Basic Books, 1986), Chapter 2.
those trust fund balances does not necessarily bear any relationship to Social Secu-
rity’s obligations to its beneficiaries or the country’s ability to pay for benefits.  Al-
though the Social Security Administration keeps track of the amount of payroll taxes
paid by each worker, those amounts do not signify ownership by the worker in the way
that the balance statement for a bank account denotes ownership.  Ultimately, the
worker’s eligibility for benefits and the amount that he or she will receive are deter-
mined by Social Security rules set in law.
In 2016, projected outlays for Social Security will begin to exceed the tax reve-
nues earmarked for the program (see the top panel of Figure 5).  Once that happens,
the federal government will need to draw on other resources to fund Social Security,
even though the trust funds will continue to be credited with interest on the balances
in the funds.  The economic and budgetary effects of having outlays exceed tax reve-
nues are the same with or without trust funds.
The financial structure of the Social Security program has resulted in a redistri-
bution of resources between generations:  each generation of workers pays taxes that
are largely used to make payments to the people already eligible for benefits.  From
Social Security’s earliest days, a contentious issue was whether the benefits that work-
ers and their families received should be prefunded using the taxes that those workers
paid, rather than the taxes paid by current workers.  As the program was enacted in
1935, revenues dedicated to Social Security would have exceeded outlays by enough
to build up very large surpluses.  In effect, those excess revenues would have helped
fund, in advance, the benefits that the same workers would receive later.  Opponents
of prefunding argued that such an arrangement would result either in pressure to in-
crease spending or in federal government ownership of private assets.  Later expan-
sions to the program, along with postponement of increases in the payroll tax rate that
were originally scheduled to occur during the 1940s, essentially moved Social Secu-
rity to a pay-as-you-go basis.23
That pay-as-you-go structure has worked, although with many changes in taxes
and benefits along the way.  But it has worked largely because the labor force has
grown rapidly during much of the program’s history.  That situation is about to
change, as the number of Social Security beneficiaries begins to increase much faster
than the number of workers.
1. An increase of that size would not be unprecedented.  Expansions in Social Security benefits and other changes
to the program described in Chapter 2, together with increases in the proportion of adults age 65 and over, have
already caused substantial growth in Social Security spending as a percentage of gross domestic product.  Spending
on Social Security did not reach 1 percent of GDP until 1955; after that, it rose to 2.5 percent in the following 10
years and then nearly doubled (to 4.9 percent) by 1983.
Chapter Three
The Challenges of an
Aging Population
Social Security may well be the nation’s most popular government program.  It iswidely credited with raising the living standards of the elderly and with provid-ing valuable insurance to workers and their families to cushion the economic
losses associated with disability and death.
Why would anyone want to change such a popular program?  Different people
have different reasons, but most of those reasons relate to one fundamental fact:  the
age composition of the U.S. population is about to change in ways that will make it
harder to continue Social Security as the program operates today.  This chapter looks
at the demographic patterns that are generating the much-anticipated graying of the
U.S. population and the implications of those patterns for Social Security.
The Demographic Outlook
Social Security’s rules for eligibility and benefits, together with favorable demograph-
ics, have kept spending for the program stable in recent years, with total outlays grow-
ing at about the same rate as the economy.  But that relationship will change once the
number of beneficiaries begins to increase much faster than the number of workers.
Since 1985, spending for Social Security has accounted for 4.1 percent to 4.6
percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).  The Social Security Adminis-
tration projects that if the laws governing the program do not change, Social Security
outlays will remain in that range from now until the first wave of baby boomers be-
comes eligible for retirement benefits (see the bottom panel of Figure 6).  After that,
from 2010 to 2030, projected outlays will climb to 6.5 percent of GDP.1  Social
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Figure 6.
The Outlook for Social Security Demographics and Spending, 2001-2075
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, The 2001 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Fed-
eral Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (March 19, 2001),
Tables IV.B2 and VI.E5 (intermediate assumptions).
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Security’s share of GDP will then increase at a much slower pace—to 6.7 percent in
2075.
The source of the projected increase in Social Security spending is the demo-
graphic outlook.  Since the mid-1970s, the United States has had roughly one Social
Security beneficiary for every three workers paying payroll taxes.  That ratio is pro-
jected to rise to nearly one beneficiary for every two workers by 2030 with the retire-
ment of most baby boomers.  After that, the combination of a low birth rate and longer
life expectancy will keep raising the ratio.  Given the government’s commitments to
provide Social Security benefits under current law, those increases in the ratio of
beneficiaries to workers translate directly into increases in spending as a percentage of
GDP.
Three facts are key to understanding why the number of Social Security benefi-
ciaries will rise at a faster rate than the number of workers over the next 30 years.
First, the inflow of newly eligible beneficiaries will soon include the huge baby-boom
generation born between 1946 and 1964.  At the peak of that postwar period, births
exceeded 4 million per year—a level not reached again until those babies grew up and
had children of their own (see Figure 7).
Figure 7.
Births in the United States, 1909-2075
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Social Security Administration (intermedi-
ate assumptions) and from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1 (1975), p. 49.
32  SOCIAL SECURITY:  A PRIMER September 2001
2. Of course, the number of people turning 65 reflects more than simply the number of births 65 years earlier.  It is
also affected by immigration to and emigration from the United States and deaths before age 65.  
3. Those estimates are “cohort life expectancies,” meaning that they represent the average number of years of life
remaining if a group of people at that age were to experience the mortality rates for the series of years in which they
reach each succeeding age.  For example, the estimated life expectancy for a 65-year-old man in 2001 reflects,
among other things, projected reductions in the mortality rates of 75-year-old men 10 years from now.  (The more
commonly reported “period life expectancies” represent the average number of years of life remaining at a given
age for a given year if a group at that age were to experience the mortality rates for that year over the remaining
course of their lives.  Period life expectancies are generally lower than cohort life expectancies.)
The oldest baby boomers (those born in 1946) will turn 65 in 2011.  For nearly
two decades thereafter, the number of people reaching 65 will surge (see the top panel
of Figure 8).  That rush will be in stark contrast to the slow inflow in recent years,
which reflects the low number of births during the Depression of the 1930s.2  
Second, life spans are expected to continue to lengthen.  In 1940 (the first year
that Social Security paid monthly benefits), the average 65-year-old man was expected
to live another 12.7 years, and the average woman another 14.7 years.  Social Secu-
rity’s actuaries estimate that today the life expectancy of 65-year-olds is 16.3 years for
men and 19.6 years for women (see the middle panel of Figure 8).3  The actuaries
predict that life spans will continue to increase throughout their 75-year projection
period.   Some analysts argue that people will live even longer during that period than
the actuaries are projecting.
Thus, even after all of the baby boomers have retired, the number of beneficia-
ries per worker will increase simply because the number of years in which Social
Security recipients are collecting benefits will rise.  That pattern could be altered,
however, if people worked to a later age and delayed applying for benefits.  That fact
is important because there is considerable uncertainty about whether people in the
future will work to later ages (see Box 3).
Third, the number of workers is likely to grow at a much slower rate both be-
cause of the exit of the baby boomers from the labor force and because of the small
size of the cohorts that immediately follow them (see the bottom panel of Figure 8).
Unless immigrants add to the population at a much greater pace than SSA projects (net
immigration of just under 1 million per year), the size of the adult population under
age 65 will not rise very much.  During most of the second half of the 20th century,
women moved into the paid labor force in large numbers, which helped maintain a
high ratio of workers to beneficiaries.  Most observers believe that further increases of
that size are unlikely to occur.  Without a large rise in the percentage of people work-
ing, slow growth in the size of the population translates directly into slow growth in
the size of the labor force.
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Figure 8.
Key Demographic Indicators for Social Security, 1940-2075
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Social Security Administration (intermedi-
ate assumptions) and from Social Security Administration, The 2001 Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance
Trust Funds (March 19, 2001), Table V.A4 (intermediate assumptions).
a. The cohort life expectancy for a given year represents the average number of years of life remaining if
a group of people at that age were to experience the mortality rates for the series of years in which they
reach each succeeding year.
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Box 3.
Will Workers in the Future Retire Later?
Lengthy periods of postemployment leisure for men are a relatively recent phenome-
non.  A century ago, men generally worked as long as they were healthy enough to do
so.  Even as late as 1950, nearly half of U.S. men age 65 or older were still in the
labor force, compared with just one in six today (see the figure below).  The labor
force participation rates of older men have been near the current level since the mid-
1980s.  The story is more complicated for women because of their rapid movement
into the paid labor force.  As more women developed careers during the past half
century, their participation rates at all ages increased.  But, like men, their participa-
tion drops sharply well before age 65.
Labor Force Participation Rates of Men and Women,
by Age Group, 1948-2000
The Outlook for Incomes
Most proposals for reforming Social Security are intended to help prepare for future
challenges rather than immediate ones; thus, projections of people’s future incomes
are important.  Such projections are inherently imprecise.  Even so, two outcomes
seem clear.  First, future workers and Social Security beneficiaries are likely to have
higher earnings and standards of living, on average, than their predecessors did.  Sec-
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Box 3.
Continued
It is not clear whether the recent stability in labor force participation rates of
older men represents a temporary pause in the long-term downward trend—perhaps
resulting from the exceptionally strong labor market of recent years—or whether
people’s attitudes toward work and retirement are beginning to change.
Researchers have linked the long-term decline in men’s retirement ages to the
growth in the nation’s overall affluence, which is expected to continue.1  Social Secu-
rity, pensions, and private savings have enabled workers to look forward to a time
when they could afford to live without working and without being financially depend-
ent on their children.  Whole industries have developed to cater to the needs and
desires of retired people.
Other researchers argue that the downward trend in retirement ages has ended
and that, in the future, more workers may well decide to retire later.2  They argue that
increases in life expectancy, the elimination of mandatory retirement, and the growth
of less physically demanding jobs may cause more workers to want to maintain some
attachment to the labor force later in life.  Moreover, the fact that people at or above
the normal retirement age no longer have their Social Security benefits reduced for
earning outside income, and the decline in employers’ use of defined-benefit pension
plans, could make working longer a more attractive option.
1. See, for example, Dora L. Costa, The Evolution of Retirement (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1998).
2. See, for example, Joseph F. Quinn, “Has the Early Retirement Trend Reversed?” (paper presented at
the first joint conference of the Retirement Research Consortia, Washington, D.C., May 20-21,
1999); and Eugene Steuerle and Adam Carasso, A Prediction: Older Individuals Will Work More in
the Future, Straight Talk on Social Security and Retirement Policy, No. 32 (Washington, D.C.:
Urban Institute, March 30, 2001).
ond, not all groups of elderly people in the future will share equally in the overall
increases in living standards.
Higher Productivity Results in Higher Average Income
How rapidly will average income rise?  The answer depends largely on the future
growth in labor productivity—that is, the growth in the amount of goods and services
produced by the average worker.  Economists generally believe that, over the long run,
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4. See Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (October 2000).
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Figure 9.
Labor Productivity in the Nonfarm Business Sector, 1951-2000
SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
increases in labor compensation (wages and benefits) tend to track increases in pro-
ductivity.  During the past 50 years, output per hour worked in the nonfarm business
sector rose by about 2 percent a year, though with considerable variation from one
year to the next (see Figure 9).  Average wages grew at a lower rate, as some of the
increases in compensation went to pay for higher health insurance costs and other non-
wage employment costs.  
Wages.  In the fall of 2000, the Congressional Budget Office projected that labor
productivity would rise by more than 2 percent per year over the next three decades.4
At that rate, output per worker in 2030 would be nearly double what it is today.
The Social Security trustees use less optimistic assumptions about the growth of
productivity and wages than CBO does, but they still project large increases over the
next several decades.  Under their intermediate assumptions, productivity would rise
by about 1.5 percent per year, and average earnings adjusted for inflation would rise
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5. Social Security Administration, The 2001 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (March 19, 2001), pp. 83 and 155.
6. The measure of income used here includes cash income received by the individual and his or her family.  It does
not include capital gains or noncash benefits (such as the value of health care covered by Medicare).
by 1.0 percent per year.  Thus, average annual earnings in 2030 would be about
$45,000 (in inflation-adjusted dollars), compared with about $34,000 today.5 
Even under those less optimistic projections, workers in 2030 would earn
enough to pay much higher Social Security taxes and still be better off than today’s
workers.  For example, the trustees project that under current law, Social Security
spending will exceed revenues in 2030 by 4.2 percent of taxable payroll (or 1.6 per-
cent of GDP).  Suppose that workers in 2030 were required to have their earnings
reduced by an additional 4.2 percent in order to close that gap.  Workers earning about
$45,000 would need to pay an extra $1,900 in taxes.  That would still leave their
wages well above the $34,000 earned by today’s average worker.
Whether future voters would be willing to accept higher taxes is unknowable.
For the past three decades, federal taxes have remained relatively stable, at between
17.2 percent and 20.6 percent of GDP.  During that period, average family income
rose by more than 40 percent.  This year, with federal taxes as a share of GDP at the
high end of that range (20.6 percent) and a large budget surplus, the Congress and the
President enacted a tax cut.
Retirement Income.  In 1999, people age 65 or older received almost 40 percent of
their cash income from Social Security (see Figure 10).6  Wages, pensions, and income
from assets accounted for most of the rest, in about equal shares.  Reliance on Social
Security was especially high among elderly people with relatively low cash income.
In recent years, elderly families who had at least one member collecting Social Secu-
rity benefits and who were in the lowest one-fifth of the income distribution received
almost 90 percent of their income from Social Security, compared with only 25 per-
cent for elderly families in the highest one-fifth of the income distribution.
How much better off will future Social Security beneficiaries be?  As with the
future course of wages, the answer depends in part on productivity.  If workers con-
tinue to produce increasing amounts of goods and services, wages should continue to
rise.  Increases in wages should, in turn, result in higher Social Security benefits and
pensions for those workers when they retire.
Under current law, Social Security benefits are directly related to a worker’s
earnings history.  Because the age at which full benefits are paid is set to increase,
average benefits will not grow as much as earnings while that change is phased in.
Thus, Social Security will not provide the same fraction of preretirement income to
future retired workers as to current beneficiaries unless future retirees work longer.
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7. For data on trends in retirement plans and other benefits, see Dallas Salisbury, EBRI Research Highlights:
Retirement and Health Data, Issue Brief 229 (Washington, D.C.:  Employee Benefit Research Institute, January
2001).
Figure 10.
Sources of Family Income for People Age 65 or Older, 1999
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2000, Chart 3.
a. Includes private pensions and annuities, government-employee pensions, Railroad Retirement bene-
fits, and payments from individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, and 401(k) plans.
Nonetheless, a worker who steadily earns the average wage and retires in 2030 at age
65 is projected to be eligible for a Social Security benefit of about $16,000 per year
(in 2001 dollars)—25 percent more than a comparable worker retiring at age 65 today
will receive.
Income from pensions and other retirement plans will probably also be higher,
both because of the projected higher earnings of future retired workers and because
many of those retirees will have worked in jobs that provided retirement benefits,
especially tax-deferred defined-contribution plans.7
Another major source of income for retired workers is their assets, which pro-
duce income in the form of interest, dividends, rents, and so forth.  Most elderly peo-
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8. According to data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 96 percent of families headed by someone ages
65 to 74, and 92 percent of families headed by someone age 75 or older, owned at least one financial asset.  Half
of the asset-holders in the 65-74 age group had holdings of at least $46,000.  Half of the asset-holders in the older
group had holdings of at least $37,000.  See Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer, and Brian J. Surette,
“Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol. 86, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 1-29.
9. For a discussion of how much workers would need to save for their retirement and a presentation of recent
empirical findings, see Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, and Anna M. Rappaport, eds., Forecasting
Retirement Needs and Retirement Wealth (Philadelphia:  Pension Research Council, Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, 2000).
10. Each year, the Bureau of the Census estimates the number of people who live in families whose cash income is
below an income cutoff, known as a poverty threshold.  The threshold varies according to such factors as family
size, number of minor children, and age of the householder and is adjusted each year for inflation.  The poverty
threshold for an elderly individual in 1999 was about $8,000; for an elderly couple, it was about $10,000.  Those
thresholds are roughly 10 percent lower than the ones for nonelderly adults.  The most recent estimates are reported
in Bureau of the Census, Poverty in the United States:  1999 (September 2000).
ple have some financial assets, such as bank accounts and money market funds.8  As
workers’ earnings increase in the future, their assets are likely to grow as well.  How-
ever, many policymakers are concerned that today’s workers are not saving enough.
That is a complicated issue because there is no objective basis for determining how
much workers should save.  The answer depends to a large extent on when they plan
to retire and what standard of living they wish to have in retirement.9
Some Elderly People Might Not Share in the Income Gains
The decline in the poverty rate of the elderly population during the past half century
has been a remarkable development.  As late as 1967, 30 percent of people age 65 or
older had income below the poverty line—triple the rate for adults under 65 (see
Figure 11).  In recent years, the poverty rate among the elderly has been about 10
percent, virtually the same as for younger adults and well below the rate for children.10
By some measures, the percentage of people living in poverty is much lower
among the elderly than among other adults.  The official measure of income used by
the Census Bureau does not include capital gains and noncash benefits (such as health
insurance subsidized by an employer or the government).  Likewise, it does not reflect
the value of owning a home.  However, the bureau does provide alternative measures
of poverty that take such factors into account.  Because most elderly people are en-
rolled in Medicare and are more likely than younger adults to own a home, those
alternative measures reduce the estimated poverty rate of the elderly by more than that
of other adults.  For example, using the bureau’s most inclusive measure of income,
the poverty rate for people age 65 or older would have been 5.2 percent in 1999 rather
than 9.7 percent.   By comparison, the poverty rate for people ages 45 to 64 would
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Figure 11.
Poverty Rates for Different Age Groups, 1966-1999
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Bureau of the Census, Poverty in the United States:
1999 (September 2000), Table B-2.
have been 5.5 percent using that measure, and the rate for people ages 25 to 44 would
have been 6.7 percent.11
Social Security clearly played a major role in the decline of the poverty rate
among elderly people (although exactly how big a role is uncertain).  For example,
from 1970 to 1972, their poverty rate declined by 6 percentage points, from 24.6
percent to 18.6 percent.  That drop coincided with three increases in Social Security
benefits that together raised the average payment by about 35 percent (adjusted for
inflation).
Some observers fear that continued prosperity over the next several decades
might not reduce the poverty rate of the elderly.  Of particular concern is the economic
outlook for elderly women who never married or who were divorced after marriages
lasting less than 10 years.  The Social Security Administration projects that in 2030,
nearly 8 percent of women age 65 or older will have never married and 15 percent will
have divorced and not remarried—almost double the percentages of last year (see Fig-
ure 12).  Obviously, specific projections are very uncertain, but the pattern of lower
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Figure 12.
Marital Status of the Female Population Age 65 or Older, 2000 and 2030
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Social Security Administration (intermedi-
ate assumptions).
marriage rates and higher divorce rates among baby boomers—compared with rates
among previous generations—seems unmistakable.
Less clear is how well those women will fare.  Many of the never-married
women will have pursued careers and, when they retire, will become eligible for
Social Security benefits on the basis of a full earnings history.  But others will have
spent part of their lives rearing children by themselves and either not working outside
the home or not earning very much.  In recent years, about one-third of single women
have had at least one child by the time they reach their early 40s.12  Those women are
ineligible for Social Security benefits based on a husband’s earnings unless they later
marry.  And unless those women develop substantial earnings histories, many of them
are likely to have low incomes when they reach their 60s.
The Budgetary and Economic Perspective
Once the baby-boom generation retires, the amount of money that the federal govern-
ment will spend on Social Security and other programs for the elderly will grow sub-
stantially (barring changes to those programs).  SSA projects that under current law,
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spending on Social Security will rise from 4.2 percent of GDP this year to 6.5 percent
by 2030—equivalent to an increase of about $240 billion in today’s economy.13
Moreover, spending on federal health care programs for the elderly and disabled will
probably rise at an even faster rate because of increases in the cost per beneficiary.  In
all, spending for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid is projected to grow from
less than 8 percent of GDP this year to roughly 15 percent by 2030.14
The resources needed to finance the government’s obligations under those
programs—and, in turn, the goods and services that those benefits will pay for—are
drawn from the overall economy when the payments are made.  In other words, in
2030 (as in any year), pledges to the elderly as well as other federal priorities—such
as national defense, aid to state and local education agencies, public health services,
and transportation projects—will require the government to draw on economic re-
sources available at that time.
One way to prepare for the demographic pressures expected later in this century
would be to take actions that increase the size of the economy (as discussed in Chap-
ter 4).  Another approach would be to curtail the growth of benefits for the elderly.  If
those benefits are to be curtailed, however, it would be useful to announce the changes
well in advance so that people who will be affected can alter their plans accordingly.
In particular, they might try to save more money or retire later.
In addition, Social Security planners may want to pay special attention to how
proposals to slow the growth of benefits would affect people with a history of low
earnings, especially people who are not eligible for a spousal benefit because they
never married or their marriage did not last for 10 years.  Several proposals have tried
to address the needs of such beneficiaries by expanding or replacing the minimum-
benefit provisions in the current Social Security law.  Another approach would be to
help those people through the Supplemental Security Income program.
The Social Security Trust Fund Perspective
The Social Security trustees project that spending for the program will begin to exceed
dedicated tax revenues in 2016 and that the Social Security trust funds will be de-
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pleted in 2038.  Those events could easily occur sooner or later, depending on a host
of economic and demographic variables that are difficult to predict accurately.15
The perspective of trust fund accounting provides, at best, only a partial view of
the challenges posed by the aging of the population.  Whether a program receives
earmarked revenues and is accounted for through a government trust fund or relies on
annual appropriations does not alter the fact that whatever resources the federal gov-
ernment is required to spend it must acquire through taxes, borrowing, sales of assets,
or some combination of those actions.  Ultimately, the government’s ability to meet
future commitments—whether Social Security benefits or some other payments—
depends on the total financial resources of the economy and the willingness of citizens
to fund those programs, not on the balances attributed to the trust funds.
Some approaches that would strengthen the government’s ability to meet future
commitments would contribute little to making the Social Security trust funds solvent.
For example, approaches that would promote productivity would most likely increase
real wages.  But under the benefit formula established by the 1977 amendments,
higher wages would eventually translate into higher Social Security benefits (although
with a substantial lag).
Likewise, some approaches for making the Social Security trust funds solvent
would, by themselves, do nothing to reduce the program’s obligations or increase the
nation’s economic capacity to meet those obligations.  For example, the Congress
could pass a law transferring enough funds from the federal government’s general
fund to the Social Security trust funds to ensure that those funds always showed a
positive balance.  That would fix the solvency problem on paper.  But such accounting
devices—moving money from one part of the budget to another—would not directly
affect either the size of the economy or the government’s obligations to the elderly.

Chapter Four
Strategies for Preparing
for an Aging Population
Any strategy to prepare the United States for an aging population must deal witha key fact:  the goods and services that retirees consume in the future will haveto be produced at that time by the U.S. economy or imported from abroad.
From that perspective, what matters is not the financial structure of the Social Security
program but the capacity of the economy.  Various options for reform will have differ-
ent effects on the economy and on the division of resources between the elderly and
other people.  To the extent that those options boost the future size of the economy
and increase the nation’s accumulation of assets, they can lessen the burden on future
workers of making payments to the elderly.
How can the federal government expand the economy?  Possible ways include
running budget surpluses or promoting private saving, which can provide more funds
for investment in business equipment, structures, and other types of capital; changing
tax and regulatory policies to make the economy more efficient or give people greater
incentives to work or improve their skills; and increasing government spending on
programs that are geared toward investment rather than current consumption.  In
addition, changing some of the rules of the Social Security program could promote
economic growth.  In most cases, increasing the size of the economy requires policy
actions that cause people to consume less or work more.  Thus, policymakers should
weigh the benefits of a larger economy in the future against the costs of those policy
actions today.
This chapter looks at three strategies that have been at the heart of the public
debate about preparing for the nation’s future needs.  Those strategies are saving
budget surpluses and using them to pay down federal debt, using the surpluses to
create private retirement accounts, and changing the rules of the current Social Secu-
rity program.  Those options are not mutually exclusive; they could be combined in
any number of ways.
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1. Federal debt held by the public is debt issued by the federal government in the form of Treasury securities and held
by nonfederal investors.  In this chapter, “debt” refers to debt held by the public.
2. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:  An Update (August 2001).
Preserving Budget Surpluses
With the federal government running a budget surplus each year, many people argue
that those surpluses should be saved and used to pay down federal debt.  Federal debt
held by the public has already declined in recent years—from about 50 percent of the
nation’s gross domestic product in 1995 to about 35 percent last year (see Figure 13).1
Continuing to pay down that debt could provide economic and budgetary benefits.  By
expanding the nation’s saving, that policy could boost the stock of private capital and
increase the size of GDP.  As a result, future workers might be better prepared to bear
the burden of making payments to an aging population.  In addition, lower levels of
debt would reduce the government’s interest payments on the debt, which could give
future policymakers more flexibility for dealing with unexpected developments.
The Mechanics of Federal Budget Surpluses
Whenever the federal government’s total yearly spending exceeds its total yearly
revenues, the government runs a budget deficit.  If the Treasury does not finance that
deficit by drawing down its holdings of cash, gold, or other assets, the government has
to borrow funds from the public by selling Treasury securities (bonds, notes, and
bills).  That additional borrowing increases the government’s debt held by the public.
The situation is not unlike what happens when a family borrows on a credit
card.  The balance on the card is a debt, which carries finance or interest charges as
long as the debt is outstanding.  The family can reduce its debt by paying off more
than it spends (including finance charges) each month.
Since 1998, the government has been running budget surpluses and repaying
debt.  Looking forward, the Congressional Budget Office projects that if current poli-
cies do not change, budget surpluses will grow and, over the coming decade, provide
enough money to pay off all of the publicly held debt available for redemption by
2010.2
CBO does not expect the Treasury to redeem (buy back) all of the outstanding
debt.  Many of the outstanding bonds will not mature for many years, and the govern-
ment does not have the right to redeem them before maturity.  Thus, the only way it
could pay off those bonds early would be to buy them on the open market.  But as the
stock of debt dwindled, debt holders might demand a premium to surrender their
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bonds.  At some point, that premium could grow so high as to make it impractical to
pay off any more debt.  Budget surpluses would then have to be invested in other
assets.  CBO calls those assets “uncommitted funds,” reflecting the fact that the Trea-
sury does not now have the legal authority to invest in most types of nonfederal assets,
such as stocks and bonds of private corporations.  Under current law, the federal
government would have to hold its uncommitted funds as cash, gold, or deposits at the
Federal Reserve or commercial banks.
Managing those holdings within the constraints of current law would be difficult
for the federal government; thus, the Treasury would probably seek authority to invest
in other assets, including stocks and debt of U.S. or foreign companies and securities
issued by foreign governments.  However, government ownership of private assets
would raise significant questions about the government’s role in the economy (dis-
cussed below).  It would also raise questions about how such securities should be
treated in the federal budget (see Box 4).
Figure 13.
Federal Debt Held by the Public as a Percentage of GNP, 1790-2000
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: This figure compares debt with gross national product (GNP) rather than the more familiar gross
domestic product (GDP) because GNP is the measure used in the historical data.  GNP measures
the total income of all U.S. residents (including net payments for capital and labor income earned
in other countries).  GDP measures the income produced on U.S. soil.  The difference between
the two was about $12 billion in 2000.
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Box 4.
The Budgetary Treatment of Government
Purchases of Private Securities
Several recent proposals envision having the government invest in private securities,
such as corporate stocks and bonds.  The possibility of such purchases raises the
question of how they would be treated in the federal budget, which operates mainly
on a cash basis.
The Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-11 on budget preparation
says that purchases of private securities should be recorded as outlays when they are
made and as offsets to outlays (offsetting receipts) when the securities are sold.
Interest and dividend payments are also supposed to be classified as offsetting re-
ceipts.  Under that treatment, the budget would not distinguish between using $10
million to buy private securities and spending the same amount to buy office supplies
or a building.  Indeed, Circular A-11 directs that all federal purchases of assets,
whether financial or physical, receive the same treatment and be shown as outlays.
That approach is consistent with the practice of recording most government transac-
tions on a cash basis. 
Some people suggest, however, that the purchase of private securities should be
treated differently because the securities would be bought as a means of financing
future government obligations and would not constitute a use of budgetary resources.
In their view, securities transactions between the government and the public, if they
are carried out at fair market prices, should leave the budget balance (surplus or defi-
cit) unaffected.  That is how the budget treats the issuance of Treasury securities
when the government borrows from the public.
Under that alternative treatment, purchases of securities would be reported as an
increase in the government’s assets, which would be exactly offset by a reduction in
another asset (cash) or an increase in a liability (Treasury debt).  Similarly, sales of
securities would leave the budget balance unaffected because the reduced value of
one asset held by the government (securities) would be exactly offset by an increase
The Economic Effects of Saving Surpluses
Using budget surpluses to pay down debt would probably raise national saving and
expand the pool of funds available for investing at home and abroad.   Over time, the
U.S. capital stock could grow larger, and the nation could accumulate more net assets
in other countries.  As investment in businesses’ structures and equipment increased,
workers would become more productive, real wages would rise, and the United States
could produce more goods and services.  In addition, the income from the extra net
foreign assets could supplement the income produced domestically.  In October 2000,
CHAPTER FOUR STRATEGIES FOR PREPARING FOR AN AGING POPULATION  49
3. That estimate is based on CBO’s midrange assumptions for population, productivity, and medical costs.  For
details, see Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (October 2000).
Box 4.
Continued
in another asset (cash).  Investing in private securities is risky, however, and changes
in the market prices of securities would result in gains and losses to the government.
Under this alternative budgetary accounting, those gains and losses would be reported
as positive or negative outlays in each reporting period.  That way, such purchases
would be treated like transactions of the financing accounts for credit programs,
profits from the government’s sale of its gold reserves, or seigniorage on the coins
that the government issues.1
Proposals for private retirement accounts also envision having people invest in
private securities, such as stocks and bonds.2  If all of the benefits and risks of private
accounts accrued to the individual owners, those accounts would be private and out-
side the federal budget.  However, the federal government (and thus taxpayers) would
retain a large interest in the accounts if people’s annual Social Security benefits were
reduced dollar for dollar by the amount of annual income they received from their
account.  In that case, many account holders would receive no net gain from having
such a private account; in effect, they would merely be acting as investing agents for
the federal government.  Because the federal government would have a substantial
interest in the holdings of the private accounts, those accounts might appropriately be
treated as governmental rather than private, with cash flows to and from them in-
cluded in the federal budget.
1. Seigniorage is the profit that the government makes from putting new currency in circulation.  It
results when the face value of the currency is greater than the cost of producing it.  Seigniorage
and the other items listed above are not recorded in the budget (in other words, they do not con-
tribute to deficits or surpluses).  However, they are regarded as “means of financing” because they
increase or decrease the amount that the government needs to borrow.
2. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of Personal Retirement Accounts,
CBO Paper (March 2000).
CBO estimated that real income per person could be about 10 percent higher in 2040
if the off-budget surpluses projected through 2010 were saved rather than used for
more government spending that consumed goods and services (see Figure 14).3
National saving would not rise dollar for dollar with an increase in federal
budget surpluses because private savers would probably reduce their saving.  There
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are three reasons for such a response.  First, higher budget surpluses would lower
interest rates, which would reduce people’s incentive to save.  Second, budget sur-
pluses arise because the government is collecting more income from households than
it is spending; as a result, households have less after-tax disposable income than they
would otherwise, which reduces both their current consumption and their personal
saving.  Third, higher budget surpluses imply lower tax liabilities in the future, which
Figure 14.
Real Income per Person Under Different Assumptions About Saving Surpluses
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTES: All of these projections use midrange long-term assumptions that are explained in Congressional
Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (October 2000).
Off-budget surpluses consist of the surpluses of the Social Security trust funds and the Postal
Service.  Under the “save off-budget surpluses” assumption, on-budget surpluses in 2000 through
2010 are zero, and off-budget surpluses match CBO’s 10-year baseline for the off-budget ac-
counts published in July 2000.  Although CBO published a new 10-year baseline in August 2001,
its projection of the off-budget surplus did not change by much.
Under the “save no surpluses” assumption, the total surplus in each year from 2000 through 2010
is zero (an on-budget deficit offsets the off-budget surplus).  Revising the assumptions to reflect
CBO’s 10-year baseline projections published in August 2001 would not significantly affect pro-
jections of debt under this assumption about surpluses.
Under the “save total surpluses” assumption, total surpluses (both on- and off-budget) in 2000
through 2010 match CBO’s 10-year baseline for the total surplus published in July 2000.  Using
CBO’s August 2001 baseline would increase the projected level of federal debt and reduce the
gap between the projected levels of real income per person under the “save total surpluses” and
“save off-budget surpluses” assumptions.
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lessens people’s incentive to save to pay future tax bills.4  Despite those consider-
ations, it is unlikely that the decrease in private saving would completely offset the
increase in budget surpluses.
Government Accumulation of Assets
One of the potential problems with saving surpluses is that the government could
accumulate a large amount of assets and possibly own a significant number of shares
in private companies.  Although asset accumulation can increase the funds available
for capital investment and boost economic growth, it would be unprecedented for the
federal government to hold a large quantity of private assets.  The possibility of such
holdings raises broad philosophical questions (would it be appropriate for the govern-
ment to own shares in and possibly control private companies?) as well as economic
questions (could the government’s involvement distort market signals and corporate
decisionmaking?).5
Answers to those questions would depend on how the investments were chosen,
the portfolio managed, and the asset-purchase program overseen.  Economic theory
and the experience of other governments provide some insights.  In principle, the
government could reduce the impact of its investments on the economy by investing in
index funds, maintaining a passive stance, and letting private shareholders determine
corporate behavior.  In addition, the investments could be managed by a board that
was subject to strict rules.  According to economic theory, if financial markets were
efficient and government investments in any particular stock were not too large, the
government would not significantly affect the prices of stocks selected for its portfolio
or alter the allocation of capital among firms.
However, financial markets may not behave exactly as economic models pre-
dict, and putting a company’s stock in the government’s portfolio might influence
stock prices and capital flows.  For example, the price of a stock often rises when the
stock is listed in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index.6  A similar situation might
occur when the government put a company on its list of stocks to buy.
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Table 2.
Asset Holdings of Retirement Funds for State and Local
Government Employees (In billions of dollars)
Type of Asset 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Corporate Stocks 829 1,085 1,234 1,343 1,352
Corporate and Foreign Bonds 211 245 280 310 322
U.S. Government Securities
Treasury 204 217 218 211 206
Agency 105 123 142 165 198
Municipal Securities 1 2 3 3 2
Open-Market Paper 28 29 38 40 46
Mortgages 17 18 24 22 22
Checkable Deposits and Currency 8 5 10 9 9
Time and Savings Deposits 2 2 2 2 1
Security Repurchase Agreements 28 29 38 40 46
Miscellaneous Assets    63    64      66      81      85
Total 1,495 1,817 2,054 2,227 2,288
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States (June 8, 2001).
NOTE: The numbers in this table represent asset holdings at the end of the year.
Many state pension funds invest in stocks and bonds.  Those funds held almost
$1.7 trillion in corporate stocks and bonds in the fourth quarter of 2000 (see Table 2).
The states have a mixed track record in insulating their investment decisions from
politics:  in some cases, investment policies bent to political pressure, and the perfor-
mance of the portfolios suffered.7  However, the overall returns on investments in state
and local pension funds are similar to those on investments in private funds (adjusted
for differences in the size and composition of the portfolios), which suggests that
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political influence may not have greatly interfered with the pursuit of market returns
for many state funds.8
Some countries have also built up large holdings of government-owned private
assets.9  Norway, for example, has accumulated net assets (primarily foreign stocks
and bonds) totaling almost half of its GDP.  It reduces political interference by having
the country’s central bank manage those investments.  However, its decision to invest
mainly in foreign securities limits its potential scope for distorting the activities of its
private sector.  Moreover, Norway is a relatively small country whose actions would
not be expected to affect world financial markets to any appreciable extent.  
The U.S. government has been successful in managing the Thrift Savings Plan
(TSP), which invests in stock and bond markets through broad-based indexes and pays
retirement benefits to federal workers through a system of individual accounts.  A
crucial feature of the TSP is that its assets are owned by federal workers, not the
government.  The board that oversees the program has a fiduciary responsibility to
manage those assets for the sole benefit of the owners of the individual accounts.10
If lawmakers decided that the federal government should not invest in private
assets, they would need to cut taxes or increase spending at some point to eliminate
budget surpluses.  Making those changes smoothly over time would be desirable be-
cause sudden shifts in policy run the risk of causing economic disruptions.
Economic Efficiency
Saving surpluses and accumulating nonfederal assets would have an uncertain effect
on the efficiency of the U.S. economy.  If surpluses were not saved and current spend-
ing policies did not change, future taxpayers could face much higher tax rates to cover
the growing costs of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and interest on the federal
debt.  Thus, saving surpluses could help reduce the pressure to raise future taxes and
possibly avoid large variations in marginal tax rates over time.  (A marginal tax rate is
the rate that applies to an additional dollar of taxable income.)  Rising marginal tax
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Box 5.
The Impact on Financial Markets of
Paying Down Federal Debt
Many private investors hold government debt (Treasury securities) in their portfolios
because it provides a relatively safe return and is highly liquid (that is, can be easily
bought and sold).  If government debt were nearly paid off, investors would have to
adjust their portfolios, and investment firms would have to change some of their
procedures for assessing the prices of assets.  
Investors would probably be able to find other assets that were relatively safe,
and U.S. financial markets would most likely create new financial instruments to
satisfy investors’ demands.  But those other assets might not be as liquid as Treasury
securities are today.  In addition, investors would have to hold assets that were proba-
bly not as safe as government debt.  Nevertheless, because the cost of guaranteeing
government debt is ultimately borne by taxpayers, higher risks to investors might be
largely offset in the long run by lower risks to taxpayers.  The effects on economic
efficiency would most likely be small.
The Federal Reserve uses Treasury securities to carry out some of its important
functions, such as buying and selling securities on the open market in order to influ-
ence the economy.  Nevertheless, it would still be able to perform open-market opera-
tions if federal debt was not available.  Open-market operations can be carried out
using any liquid asset.  However, the Federal Reserve would have to work out a num-
ber of practical problems, and policymakers might have to change the Federal Re-
serve’s charter to allow it to use other assets.
rates can be particularly harmful to economic efficiency because they reduce people’s
incentives to work and save, and the resulting losses in efficiency tend to increase by
much more than the tax rate does.11  Paying down debt lessens the pressure to raise tax
rates in the future by reducing interest payments on the debt.  (Slowing the growth rate
of federal spending could have similar effects.)
However, government investments in private assets could interfere with the
efficient operation of the nation’s capital markets.  The size of that interference is
difficult to gauge for reasons discussed earlier.  Some people also argue that if inves-
tors were not able to buy Treasury securities, efficiency in capital markets could suf-
fer, but it is doubtful that such a change would have much effect (see Box 5).
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Creating Private Retirement Accounts
A second strategy that might help the nation prepare for an aging population is to use
budget surpluses to pay for the creation of private retirement accounts.  During the
previous Congress, lawmakers introduced a host of proposals for such accounts (for a
list of those proposals, see Appendix B).  Although the proposals differed in signifi-
cant ways, they shared a common feature:  the income that would be available from an
account at someone’s retirement would depend on the contributions made to the ac-
count and the rate of return on the account’s assets during the person’s working life.
In addition, most proposals would let workers invest part of their accounts in corpo-
rate stocks (see Box 6 for a discussion of the economic effects of such investments).
Private accounts have drawn widespread interest for several reasons:
 They would give workers some freedom and responsibility for choosing
investments and planning their retirement;
 They could expand people’s access to financial markets and improve their
understanding of the value of saving;
 They might help protect budget surpluses from being used for increased
government spending or for tax cuts; and 
 They could be used to shift control of those surpluses from the government
to the private sector and thus avoid the potential drawbacks of having the
government own private assets.
Some analysts also argue that private accounts offer the opportunity for higher rates of
return than the traditional Social Security system does, but that argument can be mis-
leading (see Box 7).
Proposals for private accounts can help prepare the nation for an aging popula-
tion only to the extent that they increase national saving.  However, private accounts
are not necessary, or by themselves sufficient, to boost national saving.  As discussed
in the previous section, the government might be able to increase such saving by pre-
serving budget surpluses and paying down federal debt.  However, national saving
would not rise if the government simply financed the creation of private accounts by
borrowing.  In that case, every dollar saved in a private account would be offset by a
dollar borrowed by the government.
In setting up a system of private accounts, policymakers would also have to
confront various questions.  Would participation be mandatory or voluntary?  Would
people be given a limited choice of assets (as in the government’s Thrift Savings Plan
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Box 6.
The Risks and Returns of Stocks
Stock investments are a common feature of many proposals for Social Security.
Those proposals range from ones that would create private retirement accounts to
ones that would invest part of the Social Security trust funds in the stock market (see
Appendix A for more details).
The interest in stocks is not surprising.  Stocks have historically yielded a higher
rate of return than fixed-income securities, such as Treasury bonds.  From 1926
through 2000, for example, the real rate of return on large-company stocks averaged
about 7 percentage points more than the real rate of return on three-month Treasury
bills (see the table at right).1
However, stock investments also carry correspondingly higher risks, and the rates
of return on those investments vary greatly.  According to historical data, investors
face about a 25 percent chance of realizing lower returns from holding a portfolio of
stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index for 10 years than from holding 10-year
government notes for the same length of time.2  Moreover, for several years in a row,
a stock portfolio could lose money relative to a bond portfolio.
Analyses that focus only on the average return on stocks and ignore the risk can
be misleading.  If financial markets are efficient, the higher returns on stocks should
exactly compensate investors for the added risk.3  Although investing in the stock
market would improve the projected balances in the Social Security trust funds or in
private accounts, on average, it would also make those average balances much more
uncertain.  Adjusting the projected balances to account for that risk by using the mar-
ket’s assessment (that is, discounting them at a market risk-adjusted rate) would elimi-
nate all of the apparent gains from investing in stocks.
1. That difference may be smaller in the future.  Although the value of the stock market has dropped
over the past year, some analysts argue that it is still high relative to corporate earnings. See Robert
Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
2. Thomas MaCurdy and John Shoven, “Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation: Can Social Security
Improve Its Future Solvency Problem by Investing in Private Securities?” in John Campbell and
Martin Feldstein, eds., Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform (forthcoming).
3. Traditional economic models cannot easily explain the high returns on stocks relative to their observ-
able risk, but that situation may have more to do with the shortcomings of economists’ models than
with the possibility that investing in stocks could provide a “free lunch.”
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Box 6.
Continued
Annual Real Rates of Return on Various Types
of Assets, 1926-2000 (In percent)
Type of Asset
Average
Real Rate
of Returna
Real Rates of Return
in the 67 Percent
Confidence Intervalb
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Large-Company Stocksc 7.7 -11.4 31.0
Small-Company Stocksd 9.0 -19.3 47.4
Long-Term Corporate Bondse 2.5 -6.7 12.8
Long-Term Treasury Bondsf 2.2 -7.6 13.0
Intermediate-Term Treasury Notesg 2.2 -4.5 9.3
Three-Month Treasury Bills 0.7 -3.4 5.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office using data from Ibbotson Associates.
a. Calculated as a geometric average.
b. The range in which the middle two-thirds of the numbers fall.
c. Returns for large-company stocks are calculated from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 90 index
from 1926 to 1956 and from the S&P 500 index from 1957 to 2000.
d. Returns for small-company stocks are calculated from the smallest one-fifth of stocks by
capitalization on the New York Stock Exchange from 1926 to 1981 and from the Dimensional
Funds Advisors Small Company Fund from 1982 to 2000.
e. Returns for long-term corporate bonds are calculated from Salomon Brothers’ long-term high-
grade corporate bond index.
f. Long-term Treasury bonds have an average maturity of 20 years.
g. Intermediate-term Treasury notes have a maturity of five years.
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Box 7.
Why Comparing Rates of Return Can Be Misleading
A popular criticism of Social Security and other public pension programs that are funded on a
pay-as-you-go basis is that they produce very low “rates of return” for future beneficiaries.  To
be sure, simply comparing the present value of taxes paid into the program with the present
value of average benefits shows that the implied rate of return on the taxes paid is projected to
be low for many workers who will be retiring in the next several decades.1  If those taxes were
instead invested in private accounts, the argument goes, the expected returns would be much
higher.
Those types of “money’s worth” comparisons can be highly misleading, however.2  In any
pay-as-you-go program, the first generation of retirees in the system always receives a very high
rate of return, at the expense of later generations, who receive a correspondingly low rate of
return.  That result stems from the fact that initial generations receive benefits far greater than
the taxes they paid.  Thus, the low rate of return for later generations is not an indication of
inefficiency in the system; it merely reflects a zero-sum transfer among generations.  Changes to
the Social Security system can alter the distribution of returns among generations, but they
cannot alter this fundamental arithmetic:  raising the returns for current generations of workers
can be done only by lowering the returns for future generations.
Another way to understand this argument is to focus on the fact that taxes paid into Social
Security are not an investment.  The implicit return is determined by the program’s rules for
taxes and benefits, not by the return on any real asset.  (Investing the trust funds in stocks
would not change that analysis; see Appendix A for details.)  As noted above, the low rate of
return expected by some beneficiaries does not reflect inefficient investment or administration,
just the rules for transfers.  Because the apparent rate of return is the result of legislative action,
it could easily be increased to a level that matched or even exceeded the average return on
stocks.  Doing that, however, would require transferring wealth from later generations.
Rate-of-return comparisons can be misleading for two other reasons.  First, some of the
revenues from the Social Security payroll tax are used to finance survivors’ and disability
insurance.  Ignoring the value of that insurance can understate the benefits of the current Social
Security program.   Second, some rate-of-return comparisons overlook differences in risk.
Corporate stocks deliver a higher expected return than government bonds, but they also carry
higher risks.  On a risk-adjusted basis, investing in government bonds would provide the same
return as investing in corporate stocks.  Of course, compared with private accounts, Social
Security benefits may involve greater political risk—that is, the risk that future policymakers
will decide to reduce benefits.
1. “Present value” converts a stream of future income or payments into an equivalent lump-sum amount
received or paid today.  Of course, some beneficiaries will receive higher returns than others as a result
of their individual circumstances, but an analysis of the net benefits by age group indicates that future
workers are likely to receive much lower returns from Social Security than their parents and grandpar-
ents did.  See Dean Leimer, Cohort Specific Measures of Lifetime Net Social Security Transfers, ORS
Working Paper 59 (Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, February 1994).
2. See John Geanakoplos, Olivia Mitchell, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “Social Security Money’s Worth,” in
Olivia Mitchell, Robert J. Myers, and Howard Young, eds., Prospects for Social Security Reform
(Philadelphia:  Pension Research Council and University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
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for federal workers) or would they have the freedom to choose from a wide range of
investments (as with individual retirement accounts, or IRAs)?  At retirement, would
people have to convert the assets in their private accounts into an annuity (a series of
regular payments that continues until the person and his or her spouse dies), and if so,
under what conditions?  How would the accounts affect people’s exposure to various
sources of risk?  Would individuals be guaranteed a minimum benefit if the markets
performed poorly, and if so, who would pay for the guarantee?  How much would
administering a system of private accounts cost?  How would the accounts be financed
and integrated into the current Social Security program?  And how would a system of
private accounts handle nonworking spouses, people with disabilities, low-income
workers, and people with intermittent work histories?
The Basic Structure of a Privatization Plan
Many proposals for private accounts would combine a cut in the Social Security bene-
fits specified in current law with the establishment of mandatory private accounts that
were owned and directed by individual workers.  Such proposals—often referred to as
privatization—would give workers control over how their money was invested.  Most
privatization plans have five elements in common:
 They would provide income at retirement that would depend partly on the
contributions made into an account and the rate of return on the account’s
assets during the person’s working life;
 They would reduce Social Security benefits from the amounts specified
under current law;
 They would require (or at least give a strong financial incentive for) work-
ers to put a certain percentage of their earnings into individual investment
accounts;
 They would generally allow workers to decide for themselves how to allo-
cate their accounts among the qualified investments available; and
 They would prohibit withdrawals from those accounts until workers reached
a certain age.
The budgetary cost of setting up a system of private accounts would depend on
the details of the proposal, but the amount could be large.  For example, creating a
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12. That estimated cost excludes any additional interest payments that the government would have to make if it
financed the accounts by increasing federal debt.
13. Eric M. Engen and William G. Gale, The Effects of 401(k) Plans on Household Wealth:  Differences Across
Earnings Groups, Working Paper No. 8032 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, December
2000).
system of accounts based on 2 percent of workers’ earnings could cost about $1 tril-
lion over 10 years.12
The Effects on National Saving
Private accounts could increase national saving if they preserved some of the budget
surpluses as private saving.  The size of that increase is hard to estimate, however,
because it would depend on the specific details of the proposal and on how the gov-
ernment and the private sector responded.  Moreover, raising national saving is not
costless:  it requires people to reduce their current consumption (see Box 8).
In analyzing the impact of private accounts on government saving, the major
issue is the extent to which using surpluses for such accounts would prevent
policymakers from using them for some other purpose, such as additional government
spending or tax cuts.
In analyzing the impact on saving in the private sector, the major issue is how
the accounts would influence people’s decisions about saving.  Under many proposals,
the government would offer a tax credit that gave people some or all of the funds they
would need to set up a private account.  Because many low-income people have few
assets, an account would probably represent new savings for them.  Indeed, past expe-
rience with 401(k) plans suggests that low-income people increase their saving in
response to tax incentives, although the size of that response is hard to gauge.13  Simi-
lar responses might occur under a system of private accounts. 
Experience also suggests that most high-income people respond to tax incen-
tives by shifting their assets from other accounts into their 401(k) plan rather than by
increasing their total saving.  However, that experience may not be directly applicable
to some proposals for private accounts.  Combining a tax credit with a cut in future
Social Security benefits could limit the risk that people would reduce their other sav-
ing dollar for dollar; those who did could have less income in retirement.  With that
combination, high-income people might increase their total personal saving, including
saving in the accounts.
Despite those areas of uncertainty, using budget surpluses for private accounts
would probably increase national saving more than using surpluses for additional
CHAPTER FOUR STRATEGIES FOR PREPARING FOR AN AGING POPULATION  61
14. Tax cuts or government spending may have other economic effects besides their impact on national saving.  For
example, cuts in marginal tax rates may increase the labor supply.  In addition, some types of government spending
may increase productivity.
Box 8.
Who Would Bear the Transition Costs
of Privatizing Social Security?
Any proposal to privatize the Social Security program faces a challenge:  who would
pay for Social Security benefits during the transition from the current system to the
privatized one?  In today’s program, taxes on current workers largely finance Social
Security payments to current beneficiaries; thus, the system’s funding relies on inter-
generational transfers.  Under a privatized system, however, intergenerational trans-
fers would be replaced by workers’ financing their own retirement by building up
assets in private accounts.  Thus, a transition period would occur during which some
generations of workers might have to make payments not only to their private ac-
counts but also to current beneficiaries.  
The added costs to those transitional generations would make them worse off and
cause them to reduce their consumption of goods and services.  However, that reduc-
tion in their current consumption would have long-term benefits for the economy:  it
would boost national saving, increase the nation’s capital stock, and raise the real
wages of future generations of workers.
The government could spread the transition costs among many generations by
issuing debt that was paid off over a period of time.  Such an approach would reduce
the burden on any single generation, but it would not increase the economy as fast as
would a policy that imposed high transition costs early on. 
Using federal budget surpluses to fund the creation of private retirement accounts
could produce long-term economic gains if it displaced other, less productive uses of
those surpluses.  In that case, current generations would bear a transitional cost in the
sense that they would have to forgo tax cuts or additional spending on government
services.
government spending or tax cuts would.  Most types of government spending consume
resources, and many types of tax cuts simply stimulate private consumption.14  By
contrast, a substantial portion of the resources transferred to private accounts would
probably be saved, for the reasons discussed above.
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The Effects on the Labor Market
What effects private accounts would have on the labor market is uncertain.  Both the
current Social Security system and a private-account system could distort people’s
decisions about work.  Comparing the labor-market effects of the two systems would
require examining the specifics of the proposal for private accounts.  Without knowing
those specifics, no firm conclusions can be drawn.
On one hand, private accounts could reduce distortions in the labor market and
encourage people to work more because those accounts would tighten the link be-
tween workers’ contributions and their retirement benefits.  On the other hand, a
proposal for private accounts might include provisions (such as subsidies for contribu-
tions by low-income workers or guarantees of minimum benefits) that could distort
incentives to work.
If low-income workers received subsidies for their contributions, the subsidies
might encourage some people to join the labor force.  However, if those subsidies
were phased out as people’s income rose, they would also impose an implicit tax on
work for people whose income was in the phaseout range (because those people would
receive less subsidy for each additional dollar of income).  The size of that implicit tax
would depend on the size of the subsidy and the rate at which it was phased out.
Other labor-market distortions could arise from the fact that subsidies or guarantees of
minimum benefits would have to be paid for in some way.  If they were funded
through increases in payroll or income tax rates, they could lessen people’s incentives
to work.
Administrative Costs
Any pension system costs something to administer.  Staff must perform such tasks as
collecting funds, keeping records, managing assets, calculating and paying benefits,
overseeing and enforcing rules, and (in some cases) marketing and selling the plans.
Some lessons can be learned by looking at the administrative costs of a range of
institutions that offer retirement savings accounts or that manage programs to provide
income in retirement.  Those institutions include mutual funds, defined-contribution
pension plans, Social Security, and private-account plans in other countries.  The
experience of those institutions suggests that the administrative costs of a system of
private accounts would depend greatly on the structure of the program.  Under some
proposals, administrative costs would be modest; but those costs could be high if an
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15. For more information, see John B. Shoven, ed., Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
account system provided many services to investors and gave them a wide choice of
investments.15
Of course, administrative costs may pay for services that people value.  Some
people may want to choose whether to participate in the program, how much to con-
tribute, the mix of assets in their portfolio, and the frequency with which they adjust
their portfolio.  When they are at or near retirement, they may want choices about
whether and when to convert their assets into an annuity and the kinds of annuities to
buy.  Restricting the freedom to make financial choices reduces administrative costs,
but it may also reduce the value that people place on their accounts.
Another issue for policymakers to consider is how administrative costs would be
allocated among participants.  Two concerns arise.  First, if people do not face the
marginal costs of their transactions, they may take actions—such as churning (short-
term buying and selling) of assets in their portfolios—that raise administrative costs.
Second, if some of the fixed administrative costs are not spread among accounts, they
could absorb much of the income of people who have small accounts (because of low
incomes or intermittent work histories).
Risks and Guarantees
All public and private pension systems carry risks.  How those risks are distributed
can have significant effects on economic well-being.  This section compares two types
of public pension systems—a defined-contribution plan and a defined-benefit plan—to
show how risk might be allocated in a private-account system.  Those two public
systems have counterparts in the private sector.  Participation in private defined-con-
tribution plans was about half the level of participation in private defined-benefit plans
in the late 1970s, but the opposite is true today (see Figure 15).
A public defined-contribution plan resembles a 401(k) plan in that a defined
amount of a worker’s salary is contributed to an account and invested in assets such as
stocks and bonds.  At retirement, the worker’s income depends on the size of the
contributions and the rate of return on the assets.  In such a system, each individual
bears the risk of certain unexpected changes, such as an increase in life spans (which
creates the need for more money in retirement), a drop in wages, or a decline in the
stock market. 
With a public defined-contribution system, variations in the value of stocks can
create large differences in the retirement income of workers who retire in different
years.  The riskiness of stock investments can be dramatically reduced by requiring
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16. Gary Burtless, Social Security Privatization and Financial Market Risk, Working Paper No. 10 (Washington, D.C.:
Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, February 2000). The replacement rate for similar workers retiring at
age 62 in 2000 would have been more than 100 percent of their peak wage.
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Number of Active Participants in Private Pension Plans, 1977-1997
SOURCE: Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, “Abstract of 1997 Form
5500 Annual Reports,” Private Pension Plan Bulletin, no. 10 (Winter 2001), available at
www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/programs/opr/bullet97/cover.htm.
that workers invest in a stock market index (such as the S&P 500) composed of many
companies.  Even so, the risks cannot be eliminated.  For example, workers with
average wages who invested 6 percent of those wages in the S&P 500 index over 40
years and then bought an annuity at retirement would have replaced almost 100 per-
cent of their peak wage if they had retired at age 62 in 1969 (see Figure 16).  But if
they had retired just six years later (in 1975)—shortly after the oil price shocks of
1973 and the recession of 1974-1975, which knocked down the stock market—they
would have replaced just 42 percent of their peak wage.16  Those two years present an
extreme example, but they show some of the potential for large year-to-year fluctua-
tions in the income of retired workers who retire at different times.  Such an analysis
also shows that those fluctuations could be reduced by requiring people to hold portfo-
lios of both stocks and bonds.
In a public defined-benefit plan (such as Social Security), by contrast, workers’
income in retirement depends on their history of wages and a formula that relates
those wages to benefits.  The formula can be set up to redistribute income from people
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How the Year of Retirement Affects Income-Replacement Rates 
in a System of Private Accounts Invested in Stocks or Bonds
SOURCE: Gary Burtless, Social Security Privatization and Financial Market Risk, Working Paper No. 10
(Washington, D.C.:  Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, February 2000).
NOTES: The estimates are based on average male workers who are assumed to work for 40 years and
save 6 percent of their earnings.  Dividends and interest are reinvested.  On their 62nd birthday,
workers retire and convert their accumulations into a single-life annuity.
“Replacement rate” is the workers’ initial annuity divided by their average real annual earnings
when they were 54 to 58 years old.
who had high wages to those who had low wages, providing a type of insurance for
low-income people.
Many of the risks that individuals face in a public defined-contribution system
do not disappear in a defined-benefit system.  For example, if people live longer than
expected, public defined-benefit programs may become financially strained, creating
the political risk that policymakers will change the benefit formulas or tax rates.  If
average wages grow more slowly, average benefits at retirement will be lower (al-
though a progressive defined-benefit formula will help reduce some of the variation in
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17. Peter Diamond, “The Economics of Social Security Reform,” in R. Douglas Arnold, Michael J. Graetz, and Alicia
H. Munnell, eds., Framing the Social Security Debate: Values, Politics, and Economics (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy of Social Insurance, 1998).
wages among individual workers).  In such a program, however, risks can be shifted to
different people and across time, thus providing a form of social insurance.17
The risks of any private-account proposal depend on the proposal’s specific
provisions.  Many proposals are not for pure defined-contribution plans; instead, they
contain provisions that could pool risks among generations under certain conditions.
For example, many private-account proposals guarantee a minimum level of retire-
ment income; some may also tax earnings on withdrawals from the accounts.  If the
stock market does poorly, a minimum-benefit guarantee can shift the risks onto future
generations.  In principle, the government can transform any defined-contribution
system into a defined-benefit system by using a set of guarantees and taxes to pool
risks among generations.
Guarantees can create other problems, however.  By insuring people against
losses in their investment portfolio, the government could unintentionally encourage
investors to put money into risky assets.  If such gambles were successful, investors
would pocket handsome returns; but if they failed, the losses would be covered by the
government.  That type of “moral hazard” is a problem inherent in many insurance
contracts.  It can be reduced by restricting people’s choice of assets, but it cannot be
eliminated.
Annuities
Most of the public discussion of private accounts has focused on questions about
contributions, rates of return, and the accumulation of assets in the accounts.  Much
less attention has been paid to how people would draw down their accumulated funds
in old age, but that issue is equally important.
Today, most retirees receive a life annuity from Social Security that is indexed
to inflation.  If the retiree is married or has dependent children, Social Security also
pays benefits to his or her survivors.  In addition, many people receive annuity pay-
ments from private pensions.
Annuities like Social Security provide insurance against the risk of longevity—
that is, the risk of outliving one’s resources.  A life annuity protects against longevity
risk by providing a stream of payments for as long as the annuitant (or his or her
spouse if the contract provides survivor benefits) is alive.  The insurer (an insurance
company or the government) absorbs the uncertainty about longevity and pools that
uncertainty among many annuitants.  Since some annuitants live longer than expected
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18. Congressional Budget Office, Social Security Privatization and the Annuities Market, CBO Paper (February 1998).
and others die earlier than expected, the insurer can protect each individual against
life-span uncertainty but itself be subject only to uncertainty about the average life
span of the population.
Without access to annuities, people must divide their resources according to
their expectations about how long they will live after retirement.  They may find
themselves without enough money if their actual life span exceeds what they had
expected.  For example, someone who retires at age 65 with assets of $100,000 and
who expects to live 10 more years may choose to spend those savings in 10 equal
installments.  But if the retiree lives to age 76, he or she could end up without any
assets.
One key issue for any system of private accounts is how people would be pro-
tected from outliving their resources.  Would the system rely on private markets to
provide annuities or would the government carry out that task?  If the former, would
people be able to buy annuities at fair prices and would private markets offer the same
level of protection against longevity risk during retirement that Social Security does
now?
Although private insurance companies currently sell life annuities to retirees,
the market is very small.  The reasons include competition from Social Security
(which provides a similar product), people’s desire to leave assets to heirs, and prob-
lems in the market that raise prices.  An analysis by CBO concluded that private annu-
ities are 15 percent to 25 percent more expensive than average mortality rates would
suggest.18  That higher price reflects a combination of overhead costs and the fact that
people who expect to have longer-than-average life spans are more likely than other
people to purchase annuities (a phenomenon known as adverse selection).
If a system of private accounts was created and private insurance companies
supplied the annuities, the prices of those annuities would probably fall.  The system
would put more people into the annuities market, which could lower both overhead
costs and the share of annuitants with longer-than-average life expectancy.  Further-
more, a growing market for annuities could increase the variety of annuity products
and better adjust those products to meet consumers’ demand.
Nonetheless, some factors could hinder the functioning of the private annuities
market:  adverse selection, high marketing costs, shortsighted behavior by consumers,
and the existence of a social safety net.  Government oversight of the annuities market
and private retirement accounts could address some of those problems and reduce the
cost of annuities to society.  But policymakers would face a trade-off between balanc-
ing the gains from reducing overall costs and the losses from restricting individual
choice.
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19. Some countries have addressed that problem by requiring only that people annuitize enough of their accounts to
provide a minimum level of income in retirement.  The rest of an account could be used for any other purpose,
including being passed to children as a bequest.  In Chile, for example, people are not allowed to withdraw funds
from their account unless they have an annuity that provides income of more than 70 percent of their taxable
earnings over the past 10 years and at least 120 percent of the minimum pension.  See Congressional Budget
Office, Social Security Privatization and the Annuities Market, p. 31.
The government could sharply limit adverse selection in the annuities market by
requiring everyone with a private account to convert that account into an annuity at
retirement.  Such a requirement would increase the pool of people participating in the
market and reduce the costs of adverse selection.  However, it would also reduce peo-
ple’s choices and might not allow many retirees to pass the assets in their account to
their children.  (Life annuities end at the death of the owner, unless a joint annuity has
been purchased, in which case it ends at the death of the spouse.)19
In requiring account holders to buy annuities, policymakers would also have to
confront some difficult questions.  Would insurers be forbidden to separate annuitants
into risk classes on the basis of sex, marital status, income, health, and forebears’
longevity?  Prohibiting the separation of annuitants into risk classes results in a redis-
tribution of resources among different people.  If a low-income retiree with shorter life
expectancy pays the same price for an annuity as a high-income person with above-
average life expectancy, wealth will be redistributed from the low-income person to
the high-income one.  If unisex annuities are required, resources will be implicitly
redistributed from men to women (since women live longer, on average, than men).
Both types of redistribution could have substantial effects on the welfare of certain
groups.  Those redistributions also occur in the current Social Security system, but
they are masked by the complexity of the system.
Other Considerations
Creating a system of private accounts would require policymakers to address several
other practical issues.  First, how would the system handle benefits for nonworking
spouses, people with intermittent work histories, workers with low income, and people
with disabilities?  The current Social Security system provides benefits for those
people.  Would it continue to do so?  If so, how would the provision of such benefits
be integrated into the system of private accounts?
Second, the success of private accounts will depend partly on people’s knowl-
edge about financial markets and the quality of their financial decisions.  That is an
important issue because in 1998 (the most recent year for which data are available)
roughly half of all U.S. families did not own stock either directly or indirectly
(through mutual funds, retirement accounts, and other managed assets).  Moreover,
large percentages of U.S. families in their prime saving years did not own stock in
1998:  41 percent of families headed by someone ages 45 to 54, and 44 percent of
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Press, 1997).
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23. For more details, see Congressional Budget Office, Social Security Privatization:  Experiences Abroad, CBO Paper
(January 1999).
families headed by someone ages 55 to 64 (see Table 3).20  Of course, that may not be
a permanent state of affairs:  stock holdings could become more widespread over time
and people more knowledgeable about financial markets.
In addition, some people may have trouble making wise financial decisions.
Evidence suggests that some people spend their retirement accounts early when they
have the freedom to do so.  For example, in 1990, nearly $50 billion in pension assets
were distributed to people before they reached age 59½, and roughly half of those
distributions were spent rather than rolled over into another qualified account.21  In
addition, some married workers might not pick annuities that provide coverage for
their spouse without government regulations.  The General Accounting Office found
that the share of retired married men selecting joint and survivor annuities (which
provide coverage for their spouse) increased by 15 percentage points after passage of
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, which required workers to get written approval
from their spouse before choosing an annuity that did not provide such coverage.22
Third, policymakers would have to set up a regulatory structure to oversee any
system of private accounts.  Regulations could be aimed at protecting investors from
fraud and incompetence, ensuring that investment funds had enough capital, and
preventing people from investing in overly risky assets during their working life or
from spending down their assets too fast in retirement and then relying on public
assistance programs if they ran out of resources.  Dealing with that last issue might
require having retirees annuitize part of their wealth so they would not outlive their
resources.
The experience of private retirement accounts in the United Kingdom illustrates
some of the potential risks of inadequate oversight and regulation.  The U.K. instituted
a reform that allowed workers to switch funds from their occupation-based pension
plans to personal accounts.  In the so-called misselling scandal, representatives of
financial firms used high-pressure sales tactics to persuade some people to switch
from favorable occupational pensions to personal pensions that provided lower re-
turns.23
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Table 3.
Families’ Direct and Indirect Holdings of Stock, by Type of Family
1989 1992 1995 1998
Percentage of Families with Direct or Indirect Holdings of Stock
All Families 31.6 36.7 40.4 48.8
Families by Income (In 1998 dollars)
Less than 10,000 * 6.8 5.4 7.7
10,000 to 24,999 12.7 17.8 22.2 24.7
25,000 to 49,999 31.5 40.2 45.4 52.7
50,000 to 99,999 51.5 62.5 65.4 74.3
100,000 or more 81.8 78.3 81.6 91.0
Families by Age of Family Head
Less than 35 22.4 28.3 36.6 40.7
35 to 44 38.9 42.4 46.4 56.5
45 to 54 41.8 46.4 48.9 58.6
55 to 64 36.2 45.3 40.0 55.9
65 to 74 26.7 30.2 34.4 42.6
75 or more 25.9 25.7 27.9 29.4
Median Value of Stock Holdings Among Families with Stock
(In thousands of 1998 dollars)
All Families 10.8 12.0 15.4 25.0
Families by Income (In 1998 dollars)
Less than 10,000 * 6.2 3.2 4.0
10,000 to 24,999 6.4 4.6 6.4 9.0
25,000 to 49,999 6.0 7.2 8.5 11.5
50,000 to 99,999 10.2 15.4 23.6 35.7
100,000 or more 53.5 71.9 85.5 150.0
Families by Age of Family Head
Less than 35 3.8 4.0 5.4 7.0
35 to 44 6.6 8.6 10.6 20.0
45 to 54 16.7 17.1 27.6 38.0
55 to 64 23.4 28.5 32.9 47.0
65 to 74 25.8 18.3 36.1 56.0
75 or more 31.8 28.5 21.2 60.0
(Continued)
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Table 3.
Continued
1989 1992 1995 1998
Stock Holdings as a Percentage of Families’ Financial Assets
All Families 27.8 33.7 40.0 53.9
Families by Income (In 1998 dollars)
Less than 10,000 * 15.9 12.9 24.8
10,000 to 24,999 11.7 15.3 26.7 27.5
25,000 to 49,999 16.9 23.7 30.3 39.1
50,000 to 99,999 23.2 33.5 39.9 48.8
100,000 or more 35.3 40.2 46.4 63.0
Families by Age of Family Head
Less than 35 20.2 24.8 27.2 44.8
35 to 44 29.2 31.0 39.5 54.7
45 to 54 33.5 40.6 42.9 55.7
55 to 64 27.6 37.3 44.4 58.3
65 to 74 26.0 31.6 35.8 51.3
75 or more 25.0 25.4 39.8 48.7
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Arthur B. Kennickell, Martha Starr-McCluer, and Brian
J. Surette, “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  Results from the 1998 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 86, no. 1 (January 2000).
NOTES: Indirect holdings of stock are those held in mutual funds, retirement accounts, and other man-
aged assets.
* = 10 or fewer families surveyed.
Changing the Rules of the Current 
Social Security System
Policymakers have discussed a third approach for addressing the budgetary challenges
of an aging population:  phasing in cuts in future Social Security benefits so as to slow
the growth of the program’s spending.  In addition, some people have proposed in-
creasing the rate of the Social Security payroll tax.  Cutting benefits and raising taxes
represent different choices about how to divide economic resources between workers
and retirees and between current and future generations.  Although tax increases could
improve the solvency of the Social Security trust funds and the balance of the federal
budget, they might not address the broader economic challenges created by an aging
population.
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Reducing Benefits
Slowing the growth of Social Security spending by reducing benefits to future retirees
could be one way to lessen future pressures on the federal budget and expand the
economy in the long run.24  Indeed, economic models suggest that many types of
benefit cuts could increase GDP in the long run, although those long-term gains could
take a couple of decades to appear fully.25  How benefit cuts would affect the economy
in the near term is uncertain.
Reducing benefits would probably increase national saving, although the size of
the effect—and its path over time—is very uncertain.  The results would depend on
how much workers anticipated and responded to the cuts in benefits.  Workers who
were forward looking would probably reduce their current consumption and increase
their saving in anticipation of receiving smaller benefits.  However, some people
might not be so forward looking.  They would also have to lower their consumption,
but that would probably occur in retirement when they received smaller benefit
checks.
The effect on the labor supply of cutting future benefits would depend on the
precise nature of the cuts.  Some reductions in benefits might encourage people to
work more.  For example, raising the age for early retirement could cause some work-
ers to delay their retirement.  The size of that impact is uncertain, but an analysis of
retirement behavior around the world suggests that there is a strong link between the
earliest age at which workers can claim public pension benefits and the age at which
they retire.26  In the United States, the number of men retiring at age 62 rose signifi-
cantly after policymakers added a provision to Social Security in 1961 that allowed
early retirement at that age (see Figure 17).  Benefit cuts might also encourage work
by reducing expected lifetime income, causing people to work more to make up some
of the difference.  Conversely, benefit cuts could discourage work by reducing the
amount by which expected future benefits rise with each additional hour of work.
Slowing the growth of Social Security spending by cutting benefits would prob-
ably reduce the lifetime resources of some transitional generations.  Later generations,
however, would most likely have higher real wages and pay lower taxes, for two
reasons:  the additional national saving that would result from lower spending would
boost the capital stock and raise their wages, and the cuts in benefits would lessen the
chance that taxes would be raised in the future.
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Figure 17.
The Probability of Retirement for Men at Various Ages in Different Years
SOURCE: Jonathan Gruber and David Wise, eds., Social Security Retirement Around the World (Chi-
cago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999).
NOTE: Early retirement benefits were introduced for men  in 1961.  (They were introduced for women in
1956.)
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Because Social Security benefits are a major source of income for many people,
it would be important to announce any benefit cuts well in advance so people would
have enough time to respond by adjusting their plans for saving and retirement.  More-
over, if the changes were made in a way that preserved the benefits of low-income
people, then larger cuts would be necessary in the benefits received by other retired
workers. 
Some of the major issues involved in reducing benefits can be seen by looking
at three options:  speeding up the increase in the retirement age, lengthening the num-
ber of years of employment for which Social Security benefits are calculated, and
reducing annual cost-of-living adjustments.
Accelerate the Increase in the Retirement Age.  Under current law, workers born
before 1938 become eligible for full Social Security retirement benefits at age 65.
That normal retirement age increases in two-month increments for people born there-
after, reaching 66 for workers born in 1943.  It remains at 66 for workers born be-
tween 1944 and 1954 and then begins to rise again in two-month steps, reaching 67 for
people born in 1960 or later.  Workers will still be able to start collecting reduced
benefits at age 62.  But as the NRA increases and moves further away from age 62, the
size of that reduction will grow.
Members of Congress and others have recommended speeding up the change to
a normal retirement age of 67.  One option would steadily increase the NRA by two
months per year until it reached 67 for workers born in 1949.  Under that option, the
first people to face a normal retirement age of 67 would become eligible for reduced
benefits (at age 62) in 2011, which is 11 years sooner than under current law.
The savings from that change would begin as workers in the first affected age
group (people born in 1944) reached age 62 in 2006.  Each year after that, the savings
would grow as more beneficiaries were affected, with each successive group incurring
larger reductions in benefits. Workers in the first group who began collecting benefits
at 62 would receive about 1 percent less than they would under current law.  Workers
who turned 62 in 2011 would receive about 7 percent less than they would under
current law.  Some Social Security beneficiaries with low income would qualify for
federal means-tested programs, such as Supplemental Security Income and Food
Stamps, so part of the savings in Social Security benefits might be offset by greater
spending for other programs.
Proponents of raising the normal retirement age point out that, on average,
people are healthier and live longer today than was the case in the early days of Social
Security, and thus they may be able to work for a longer part of their lives.  Opponents
argue that raising the normal retirement age is nothing more than another way to cut
future monthly Social Security benefits.
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Lengthen the Computation Period for Benefits.  Social Security retirement benefits
are based on the average indexed monthly earnings of workers in jobs covered by the
system.  The current formula computes those earnings on the basis of a worker’s 35
highest-earning years of employment.  Lengthening that averaging period would gen-
erally lower benefits slightly by requiring more years of lower earnings to be factored
into the benefit computation.
One argument for lengthening the computation period is that it would encourage
people, who are now living longer, to stay in the labor force longer as well.  It would
also reduce the advantage that workers who postpone entering the labor force some-
times have over people who get jobs at a younger age.  Because the AIME calculation
is based on 35 years of employment and thus can ignore many years of low or no
earnings, people who enter the labor force later suffer little or no loss of benefits for
their additional years spent not working and not paying Social Security taxes.
Opponents argue that this option would hurt beneficiaries who retire early be-
cause of poor health or unemployment—the people who would be least able to con-
tinue working.  It would also disproportionately affect people who spent significant
time outside the Social Security system—such as parents (usually women) who inter-
rupted their career to raise children—and workers who were unemployed for long
periods.
Reduce Cost-of-Living Adjustments.  Each year, the Social Security Administration
must adjust recipients’ monthly Social Security benefits for inflation.  To do so, it
raises benefit payments by the percentage increase in the consumer price index.  Some
policymakers suggest that the law be changed so that the yearly COLA equals the
increase in the CPI minus a specified amount, such as 0.5 percentage points.
Many economists believe that the CPI may overstate increases in the cost of
living, but they disagree about the size of the overstatement.  There are conceptual
problems with devising a “true” cost-of-living index, as well as difficulties collecting
and compiling data for such an index.  For those reasons, economists have had trouble
reaching a strong consensus on this issue.  In 1996, the Advisory Commission to Study
the Consumer Price Index (known as the Boskin Commission) concluded that the CPI
probably overstates the change in the cost of living by between 0.8 and 1.6 percentage
points a year.27  Since the commission’s report was issued, the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics has made several changes to the way it calculates the CPI and eliminated some of
the problems with the index.  But some thorny issues remain, including how to mea-
sure the cost of living for Social Security beneficiaries.
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To the extent that the CPI still overstates increases in the cost of living for those
beneficiaries, policymakers could reduce COLAs by a corresponding amount without
making Social Security recipients’ real benefits lower than they were when the recipi-
ents became eligible for the program.  Moreover, reducing cost-of-living adjustments
by a relatively small amount could save a great deal of money.
The impact of even a small cut in COLAs, however, would be significant for
future older beneficiaries, whose benefits would reflect the cumulative effects of a
series of smaller COLAs.  In the long run, the people whose benefits would be most
affected would be the oldest recipients and those who first became eligible for Social
Security at an early age on the basis of disability.
The Effects of Raising Payroll Taxes
Another option—which would address the narrow issue that promised Social Security
benefits are expected to exceed the revenues dedicated to the program—would be to
raise payroll taxes.  Because what really matters is the overall budget balance, any tax
could be increased to finance future Social Security spending.  However, to limit the
scope of the analysis, this report focuses on the Social Security payroll tax.
The Social Security trustees project that the gap between the program’s income
and costs in 2050 will be about 4.6 percent of the nation’s taxable payroll.28  Thus,
increasing the combined payroll tax on workers and their employers from 12.4 percent
to 17.0 percent at that time would be one way of dealing with the shortfall.29
The payroll tax rate has been raised several times since the Social Security
system was created in the 1930s (see Figure 18).  The total rate (including the shares
paid by employers and employees) was only 2 percent when the program began, but it
increased in a series of steps over the years to the current rate of 12.4 percent.  The
wage base to which the tax rate applies also rose during that period.  In 1951, the
payroll tax was assessed on workers’ earnings up to $3,600, which was 148 percent of
the average wage at that time (see Table 4).  By 1999, the payroll tax applied to earn-
ings up to $72,600, or 251 percent of the average annual wage.  This year, the maxi-
mum level of earnings for the tax is $80,400.
Although employers nominally pay half of the payroll tax, the burden of the tax
largely falls on workers.  Both economic theory and empirical studies suggest that
most of the tax is shifted to workers in the form of lower wages and less generous
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Figure 18.
The Payroll Tax Rate for Social Security, 1937-2000
SOURCE: Social Security Administration.
NOTE: The payroll tax rate includes both employee and employer payments.
fringe benefits.30  Workers would also bear most of the burden of any increase in the
tax rate.
Raising the payroll tax rate would reduce the marginal return from working (that
is, the return from an additional hour worked).  For many workers, raising the payroll
tax rate by, say, 5 percentage points could reduce their marginal after-tax compensa-
tion by almost 10 percent (compared with what that compensation would be other-
wise).31  Those workers could include people in families in the 28 percent income tax
bracket and some low-income workers who already face high implicit marginal tax
rates because the earned income tax credit phases out as they earn more.32
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Table 4.
The Payroll Tax Base for Social Security and Average Wages 
in Selected Years, 1951-1999
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 1999
Maximum Taxable Earnings
(Dollars) 3,600 4,800 7,800 29,700 53,400 72,600
Average Wage for a Worker
Covered by Social Security
(Dollars) 2,425 3,573 5,754 12,600 20,487 28,948
Maximum Taxable Earnings
as a Percentage of the
Average Covered Wage 148 134 136 236 261 251
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Social Security Administration.
Increasing the payroll tax rate would probably reduce the labor supply (com-
pared with keeping the tax rate steady).  The size of that effect would depend on how
workers responded to the increase.  Some information can be gleaned by examining
how workers responded to earlier changes in their after-tax wages.  Based on past
observations, the total supply of labor could decline by between zero and 3 percent for
each 10 percent drop in after-tax wages, with virtually all of the response coming from
second workers in households that already have one worker.33  However, responses
outside that range are not unlikely.34
The effect on GDP of raising the payroll tax rate is less certain; it would depend
on what was done with the additional revenues.  If the government did not use them
for another purpose, those revenues would increase government saving, which could
boost national saving.  In that case, the impact on GDP would depend on whether the
positive effects on economic growth from more national saving outweighed the nega-
tive effects on the labor supply.  Moreover, the decline in interest costs associated
with lower federal debt could allow policymakers to reduce the payroll tax rate in the
future, which could have a positive long-term impact on the economy.
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By contrast, if the extra payroll tax revenues were used to finance more govern-
ment consumption spending, national saving would not rise.  Further, because the
labor supply would probably fall, the policy would most likely reduce GDP.  In that
case, the tax increase could make it more difficult for the nation to prepare for an
aging population.
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Appendix A
The Economic Effects of
Having the Government Issue Debt
to Finance Investments
in the Stock Market
Some proposals for Social Security reform envision having the government issuedebt and invest the proceeds in corporate stocks.  Such a policy raises concernsabout possible government interference in corporate decisionmaking (discussed
in Chapter 4).  It also raises questions about how such investments would affect the
overall economy.  Those economic effects are uncertain, however, because they would
ultimately depend on how future Congresses allocated the risks and the returns of
stock investments among various people.
Such a policy would essentially represent a swap of assets between the public
and private sectors.  The government would buy shares of stock from private investors
and issue Treasury bonds of the same value.  Other things being equal, such an ex-
change cannot create wealth for the government:  the value of the stocks in the govern-
ment’s portfolio would exactly match the value of the bonds that it sold to the public.
The investment policy would affect the economy only to the extent that it redis-
tributed income.  That redistribution could either increase or decrease saving depend-
ing on how the government reallocated the income from the investments.  If, for exam-
ple, current generations received higher benefits when the stock market did well but
did not receive lower benefits when the market soured, government investments in
stocks would redistribute income toward current generations.  That would encourage
current consumption, reducing national saving and future gross domestic product.1
Current generations would be better off because of such a policy, but future genera-
tions would be worse off.  
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The government could also redistribute investment income to people who do not
own stocks now.2  However, the economic impacts of such a policy are uncertain.  On
one hand, that redistribution could raise interest rates, which might cause some people
to save more.3  On the other hand, it would increase the income of people who save
but do not own stocks, which could cause some of those people to save less.  The
latter effect could be significant:  by one estimate, it could cause the private stock of
capital to decline by 50 cents for each dollar invested by the Social Security trust
funds.4
Some people argue that because the government could pool the risks of stock
investments broadly over time and among people, it could bear such risks at less cost
than individuals can.  However, that argument ignores the fact that people already
implicitly share the risks and rewards of stock market investments through the income
tax system.  Indeed, some of the recent improvement in the federal budget can be
traced to the rise in the stock market and the resulting revenues from capital gains
realizations.  Explicit stock investments might produce no additional benefit.  More-
over, to pool risks, the government would have to distribute stock losses as well as
gains to people who do not hold stocks now.  There are doubts that the government
would really do that, especially since many of those people have low income.
In addition to the effects on saving and risk sharing, government investments in
the stock market could raise interest rates on government debt and reduce returns on
stocks.  Those possibilities stem from the fact that to induce private investors to buy
additional government bonds instead of stocks, interest rates on bonds would have to
rise relative to those on stocks.
Appendix B
Proposals for Private Accounts
in the 106th Congress
The table below lists proposals to create private retirement accounts that wereintroduced in the 106th Congress in 1999 and 2000.  (None of the proposalswere enacted.)  Those bills were among many proposals to change the Social
Security program.
Bill Number Title of Bill Sponsors
House Bills
H.R. 249 Personal Retirement Act of 1999 Mark Sanford
H.R. 251 Strengthening Social Security Act of 1999 Mark Sanford
H.R. 874 Individual Social Security Retirement
Accounts Act of 1999
John Porter, Spencer Bachus,
Mark Sanford, Ernest J. Istook Jr.,
Christopher Shays, Nick Smith
H.R. 1793 21st Century Retirement Act Jim Kolbe, Charles Stenholm,
Nick Smith, Cal Dooley, 
Mark Sanford, Carolyn McCarthy,
James C. Greenwood
H.R. 1897 Retirement Security Act of 1999 Thomas Petri
H.R. 3206 Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 Nick Smith, Charles Stenholm,
John Porter, Jim Kolbe, 
Thomas J. Campbell, 
Mark Sanford, John Shadegg, 
Patrick J. Toomey
H.R. 5659 Personal Social Security Act of 2000 John Kasich
(Continued)
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Bill Number Title of Bill Sponsors
Senate Bills
S. 21 Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Robert Kerrey
S. 588 Social Security for the 21st Century Act Jim Bunning
S. 1103 Personal Security and Wealth in 
Retirement Act of 1999
Rod Grams
S. 2740 Savings Accounts Are Valuable for 
Everyone Act of 2000
Mary Landrieu
S. 2774 Bipartisan Social Security Reform Act 
of 2000
Judd Gregg, Robert Kerrey, 
John Breaux, Charles Grassley,
Fred Thompson, Charles Robb,
Craig Thomas
S. 3200 Social Security KidSave Accounts Act Robert Kerrey, Rick Santorum,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Charles Grassley, John Breaux
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